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DOES LAND ABUNDANCE EXPLAIN AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS?
JAMES FENSKE*
Abstract.  I show how abundant land and scarce labor shaped African institutions before colonial
rule. I present a model in which exogenous suitability of the land for agriculture and endogenously
evolving population determine the existence of land rights, slavery, and polygyny. I then use
crosssectional data on pre-colonial African societies to demonstrate that, consistent with the model,
the existence of land rights, slavery, and polygyny occurred in those parts of Africa that were the
most suitable for agriculture, and in which population density was greatest. Next, I use the model
to explain institutions among the Egba of southwestern Nigeria from 1830 to 1914. While many
Egba institutions were typical of a land-abundant environment, they sold land and had disputes over
it. These exceptions were the result of a period of land scarcity when the Egba first arrived at
Abeokuta and of heterogeneity in the quality of land.
Keywords: Africa, institutions, land rights, slavery, polygyny.
JEL Codes: N57,O10.
1. Introduction
Institutional failures such as corruption, bureaucracy, a lack of democracy, and deficient public
services are a major cause of African poverty (Collier and Gunning, 1999a,b). The continent’s rare
successes, similarly, are understood largely as stories of institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2003). The
importance of institutions is not unique to Africa, as they are one of the principal channels through
which history affects outcomes in the present (Greif, 2006; North, 1991; Nunn, 2009; Rodrik et al.,
2004). Institutions, in particular those that protect private property, were instrumental in the rise
of the “West” (Acemoglu et al., 2009, 2005; North and Weingast, 1989) and explain many of the
differences in outcomes across former colonies (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005;
Dell, 2009; Iyer, 2008; Porta et al., 1997). This paper explains the origins of African institutions
by showing how land rights, slavery, polygyny, and state strength in Africa prior to colonial rule
were shaped by the continent’s sparse population.
History has shaped African development. The investments made and the institutions established
under colonial rule continue to affect outcomes in Africa today (Bertocchi and Canova, 2002; Bolt
and Bezemer, 2009; Huillery, 2009; Price, 2003). Existing arrangements, African resistance and
limited resources, however, constrained what institutions were put in place by colonial powers
(Austin, 2008b; Bubb, 2009; Huillery, 2008). As a result, pre-colonial institutions and the forces
that shaped them, including state centralization, polygyny, indigenous slavery, and involvement in
the slave trades, also shape current performance in Africa (Bezemer et al., 2009; Englebert, 2000;
Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Nunn, 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2008; Tertilt, 2005).
Explaining the nature of pre-colonial institutions in Africa is, then, important in understanding
its current poverty. Several recent contributions have suggested that geography plays a major role
in shaping institutions. Geographic features, such as continental orientation, settler mortality, suit-
ability for specific crops, and other biogeographic endowments predict contemporary institutional
differences across countries (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Diamond, 1997; Easterly, 2007; Easterly and
Levine, 2003; Olsson, 2004; Olsson and Hibbs, 2005). In Africa, Nunn and Puga (2007) find that
more rugged countries were able to escape the worst institutional effects of the slave trades. En-
german and Sokoloff (1997) have influentially argued that factor endowments in the Caribbean and
Brazil were conducive to slave labor and large plantations, which set Latin America on a long-run
path of higher inequality and less democratic political institutions than what developed in North
America.
A major argument in the literature on African history is that the continent’s geography has given
it an abundance of land relative to labor, which explains the general features of its development
(Austin, 2008a, 2009b; Hopkins, 1973; Iliffe, 1995). This view holds that, since uncleared land
was freely available, land had no price, rights to land were ill-defined, cultivators were not willing
to become free workers, coerced and household labor substituted for wage employment, capital
markets were constrained because land had no value as collateral, and states that could not tax
land remained small and weak.
I test this thesis using two types of evidence. First, I employ data on a cross-section of African
societies from Murdock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas to support a model of land rights and slavery
in which the land-labor ratio determines the institutions that exist. I find that the model correctly
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predicts that land rights and slavery were found in those pre-colonial African societies that occupied
the territory most suitable for agriculture, and that greater population densities were correlated
with rights over land. Slavery was present in the most densely settled parts of Africa, reflecting
the high opportunity cost of coercion at low levels of population. Polygyny existed in the most
agriculturally suitable and most thickly settled parts of Africa; dense population is needed for
inequality to emerge. While states were most developed in the most populated regions, agricultural
suitability was not one of their systematic determinants.
Second, I trace how land abundance shaped economic institutions among the Egba of south-
western Nigeria between 1830 and 1914. While the Egba resembled in many ways the standard
predictions for a land-abundant society, there are two principal exceptions to this pattern. First,
the Egba sold land as early as 1870. Second, land disputes existed. These deviations are explained
by initially high population densities created by the settlement of the Egba as refugees at Abeokuta,
and by the specific features of certain parcels of land that gave them uncommon value.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the literatures in economics and
African history on how land abundance has shaped economic institutions. Section 3 presents the
model, extends it to include polygyny, and identifies its testable implications. Section 4 tests
the model by combining geographic data on population and the environment with institutional
outcomes recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas. Section 5 accounts for the nature of property rights
over land, labor, and capital in Egba society from 1830-1914. Section 6 concludes.
2. The land abundance view of African history
Herbst (2000, p. 16) estimates the population density of Sub-Saharan Africa in 1900 at 4.4 persons
per Sq. Km, contrasted with 38.2 for South Asia, 45.6 for China, and 62.9 for Europe.1 Explanations
of low African population densities stress geographic factors, the disease environment, and historical
factors such as the slave trades (Mahadi and Inikori, 1987, p. 63-64). This sparse settlement,
Hopkins (1973, p. 23-27) argues, shaped institutions, because Africans “measured wealth and power
in men rather than in acres.”2 Iliffe (1995, p. 1-2) summarizes this “land abundance” view:
Agricultural systems were mobile, adapting to the environment rather than trans-
forming it ... Social organization also sought to maximize fertility, especially through
polygyny, which made generational conflict a more important historical dynamic
than class conflict. Sparse populations with ample land expressed social differen-
tiation through control over people, possession of precious metals, and ownership
of livestock ... Scattered settlement and huge distances hindered transport, limited
the surplus the powerful could extract, prevented the emergence of literate elites
and formal institutions, left the cultivator much freedom, and obstructed state for-
mation.
1His estimate for North Africa is 9.4 persons per Sq. Km.
2Austin (2008a, p. 589) argues that Hopkins was the first to make this analysis systematic; earlier writers on Africa
did account for the existence of slavery, for example, by noting Africa’s land abundance – see Dowd (1917).
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This section reviews the literatures on economic institutions in land-abundant agrarian societies
and on how sparse population has shaped African history. It deals in turn with four major themes:
land, labor, capital, and states.
2.1. Land.
2.1.1. Theory. With land abundance, monitoring costs in agriculture, and no scale economies, land
will have no price and communal land will substitute for insurance (Binswanger and McIntire, 1987,
p. 82-83). Boserup (1965, p. 13) argues that exogenous population growth increases the frequency
of cultivation; families become more “conscious and jealous about their special right to the old
plots” (p. 80), reduce fallow, and exert effort to retain their rights. Demsetz (1967, p. 350) suggests
that integration into the world market will similarly lead property rights to develop in order to
internalize externalities.
2.1.2. In African history. In the most extreme cases, African cultivators did not return to their
old farms after they were left fallow.3 Before the Atlantic slave trade, this led to settled clearings
surrounded by vast wastelands in the Equatorial region, circles of increasingly wild vegetation in
the West African forest, and clusters with oscillating frontiers in the West African Savanna. Austin
(2009b, p. 33) argues that, as a consequence, land was “easily and cheaply accessible in institutional
terms”; pre-colonial authorities were eager to attract “more people with whom to subdue nature
and, if necessary, their neighbors,” so that strangers could generally acquire land indefinitely for
token payments. These payments were made solely to acknowledge the sovereignty of the local
authorities. Citizens were given land virtually freely.
Austin (2008a, p. 591-594) notes that ‘islands’ of intensive agriculture have existed where in-
security has created artificial land scarcity and in specific locations of exceptional value. These
had minerals, trees, market access, or suitability for particular crops. In pre-colonial Tanganyika,
while most land was freely available, the best land (banana plots, areas between highland and
brush, and volcanic craters) was subject to specific rights and even sold (Iliffe, 1979, p. 16). In
pre-colonial West Africa, isolated examples can be found where scarcity produced markets over land
as a productive resource during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Austin, 2009b, p. 33-35).
Against these views, Spear (1997, p. 154-157) argues that the Boserupian mechanism cannot
explain individual cases. While on Mount Meru both the Arusha and the Meru intensified their
agriculture as population rose, the less densely settled Meru did so more readily. Berry (1988),
similarly, has noted that tree crops have not always created individualized tenure in West Africa,
as inheritance rules, tenancy contracts, and labor arrangements can give many persons claims over
the same farm. Thornton (1992, p. 75-76) suggests that ownership of land results from legal claims,
not population pressure. The statistical results in Section 4 counter these objections by showing
that the institutional effects of population and agricultural productivity are systematic, even if they
are not deterministic.
2.2. Labor.
3The regional survey here summarizes Iliffe (1995, p. 36 and 64-67).
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2.2.1. Theory. With easy access to land and monitoring costs, employers cannot compensate labor-
ers for forgone self-cultivation, and so there will be no laboring class and almost no hiring of labor
during the peak season (Binswanger and McIntire, 1987, p. 76). Vertically extended households,
whose heads have claims over the labor of their dependents, substitute for insurance and annuities
that the thin capital market cannot provide (see below).
Land abundance has also been used to explain slavery. Domar (1970), building on Nieboer (1900),
ties the the existence of serfdom in Eastern Europe to labor scarcity; free land, free peasants, and
non-working landowners cannot coexist.4 Land abundance is also held to affect family structure.
Goody (1969, p. 66) argues that the ability of distant relatives to inherit in Africa is due to the
lack of class differentiation and low value of land. Similarly, Goody (1976, p. 17) suggests that
polygyny exists where allocating land to additional wives is less costly.
2.2.2. In African history. For Austin (2008a, p. 606-610), scarcity of labor explains African use
of extensive agriculture, dry season crafts and industries, and forced labor. With some notable
exceptions (Rodney, 1966), slavery was prevalent in much of Africa even prior to the Atlantic slave
trade (Fage, 1969). Watson (1980, p. 10) suggests that the ability of slaves and their descendants
to assimilate into their owners’ lineages was a “logical extension of the institutionalized need for
more people.” Land abundance has also been used to explain specific cases (e.g. O’Fahey (1985,
p. 91)) and differences across African societies. Northrup (1979) contrasts the densely-settled Igbo
of the palm belt with the relatively sparsely populated northeastern Igbo during the palm oil trade.
Slavery did not expand in the palm belt, while the northeastern Igbo used slaves extensively in
their colonization of new land.
Family structures in Africa have also been linked to sparse population. Tambiah and Goody
(1973, p. 23) explain bride-price by noting that, since men are not distinguished by land holdings,
the price of a husband is low. Iliffe (1995, p. 96) argues that intense competition for women within
and across generations led to the payment of bridewealth. Because wives’ labor and reproductive
capacities are so important, more than half of customary court cases in Africa are disputes over
marriage, divorce or bridewealth (Kopytoff, 1987, p. 43). I differ from these views, and argue that
polygyny can only exist when population is great enough for an elite to have already differentiated
itself from the mass of the population.
The use of underpopulation to explain African slavery is controversial. Kopytoff and Miers (1977,
p. 68-69) object that slaves filled social and political functions for which entire persons were needed,
and not simply their labor. Further, political insecurity prevented people from taking advantage
of surplus land and pushed them into servitude. Lovejoy (1978, p. 349) argues that slavery in the
Sokoto Caliphate was “based on non-market principles,” as slaves and output were redistributed
4Conning (2004) has formalized this reasoning, finding that the return to enslavement rises with the land-labor
ratio. Contra Domar (1970), North and Thomas (1971) argue that, during the fourteenth century, plagues in Europe
increased the land-labor ratio, intensifying competition between landlords for tenants and resulting in a relaxation
of servile obligations. Engerman and Sokoloff (2005), similarly, argue that abundant land and an absence of scale
economies prevented the formation of large estates in Pennsylvania, Maryland, New York and Canada. In both these
examples, the failure of slavery to emerge resulted from the limited means of coercion available to would-be lords.
North and Thomas (1971) suggest that the lack of a centralized state failed to prevent slaveowners from competing
over slaves. In the North American case, Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) acknowledge that the northern U.S. was
priced out of the market for slaves as early as the 1760s.
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mostly through the state. Miers and Klein (1998, p. 4-5), Miers (1998, p. 20) and Roberts and
Miers (1988, p. 20) stress factors other than labor scarcity that made colonial rulers hesitant to
abolish slavery, including their dependence on slave-owning elites, fear that abolition would divert
trade, worries about disrupting peace, unwillingness to undermine male control of women, and
their experience with India. Austin (2009a) responds that the rise in slave-holding throughout the
Atlantic slave trade and the nineteenth century cannot be explained by the non-economic uses of
slaves. The econometric results in Section 4 demonstrate that the presence of slavery across African
regions was systematically related to the economic value of slaves and to population.
Kopytoff (1987, p. 46) suggests that dependents must be “seduced” rather than coerced, so
slavery can only exist in complex societies with “well-developed systems of compulsion.” Goody
(1980, p. 26-31), similarly, argues that slavery was most prevalent in states that victimized their
neighbors. Section 3 will demonstrate that high costs of coercion at low population densities can
be incorporated into a model in which slavery is explained by the high cost of free labor.
2.3. Capital.
2.3.1. Theory. Binswanger and McIntire (1987, p. 78) argue that credit markets under land abun-
dance will be constrained by supply; land that has little value cannot serve as collateral. Livestock,
prone to disease and theft, is a poor substitute for land as collateral (Binswanger and Rosenzweig,
1986, p. 517). Without land tenancy, interlinked credit cannot overcome information problems
(Binswanger et al., 1989, p. 135). Simple technology and the thin hiring market similarly constrain
the credit market from the demand side (Binswanger and McIntire, 1987, p. 78).
2.3.2. In African history. According to Austin (2009b, p. 33-37), credit transactions in pre-colonial
West Africa were not a capital “market,” but instead a “vast range of discrete bargains between
parties who would not have had the information to offer or receive competing terms from others.”
Capital markets were not well distinguished from consumption loans. Interest rates were high.
Loans were given in “extra-economic” relationships such as personal acquaintances, rotating savings
and credit associations, family, patronage, or ethnic and religious diasporas. Austin (1993) argues
that main cause of borrowing in pre-colonial West Africa was illiquidity, as cash was needed for
major expenses such as funerals, to overcome slow turnovers in long-distance trade, and for scarce
working capital. Since states were weak, repayment was enforced through private means such
as panyarring (hostage-taking), secret societies, and the “court of public opinion.” With land
unavailable as collateral, most substantial loans were backed by human pawns. The discussion
of the Egba in Section 5 shows how these considerations shaped credit-provision within a single
African society, and teases out interactions that existed between the land, marriage, labor and
capital markets.
2.4. States. Prior to colonial rule, the “typical” Atlantic African lived in a state with an area no
larger than 1,500 square kilometers and fewer than 30,000 inhabitants (Thornton, 1992, p. 105).
African states were, Austin (2004a, p. 25) argues, “webs of relationship which grew steadily weaker
with distance from the capital until they merged into the statelessness of peripheral peoples.”
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Herbst (2000) has taken the broadcasting of power over sparsely populated territories to be the
central problem facing African states past and present.
States could not raise revenues from land.5 Unable to tie subjects to the land and tax them, states
could not make land artificially scarce. Revenues for most states came from other sources, such
as trade tolls. Rulers sought subjects and cattle, rather than territories. Warfare was for tribute
or captives, rather than land. The ease of exit gave rise to the systematic formation of frontier
settlements on the margins of successful African polities, in which many of the central features of
African social organization were forged, including the importance of kin, divisions between first-
comers and latecomers, and patrimonialism (Kopytoff, 1987). The econometric results presented
in Section 4 will demonstrate that state strength in Africa has been systematically related to
population, but not to agricultural suitability.
3. Model
This section extends the model of “slavery and other property rights” from Lagerlo¨f (2009)
to include slave raiding from neighboring societies and polygyny. This formalizes the literature
outlined in Section 2, as elite preferences over egalitarianism, slavery, and free labor are driven
by agricultural productivity and population size. Population lowers wages and average product,
making free labor preferable to slavery or egalitarianism. Productivity makes coercion worthwhile.
The model adds to the literature by recognizing the importance of productivity and the high cost of
coercion when population is low. Section 3.1 sets up the model. Section 3.2 describes its dynamics.
Section 3.3 allows wives to be purchased, lowering the cost of children. Polygyny will only occur if
inequality already exists. Section 3.4 outlines two tests of the model implemented in Section 4.
3.1. Setup. A society in period t has a population Pt of non-elite agents and a population of elite
agents that has zero mass. Non-elite agents work; elite agents do not. Both live for one period.
The elite is randomly selected from the population at the beginning of each period. Agents choose
fertility nt and consumption ct. Children cost q each. If income is It, each agent’s budget constraint
is:
ct = It − qnt.(1)
With no utility from leisure, non-elite agents supply one unit of labor each. Utility is given by:
Ut = (1− β) ln ct + β lnnt(2)
⇒ n∗t = (β/q)It(3)
Production is Cobb-Douglas, and output Yt depends on land T , land-augmenting productivity
A˜, and the labor used Lt:
Yt = (TA˜)
αL1−αt ≡ AαL1−αt ,(4)
5The rest of this paragraph summarizes arguments made in Austin (2004a) and Austin (2004b).
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where α ∈ (0, 1). A depends on A˜ and T , but will be interpreted as agricultural suitability,
given exogenously by the physical environment. The elite’s payoff in period t under each of the
three institutions, egalitarianism, slavery, and free labor, is given by piit, where i ∈ {E,S, F}. The
population’s payoff is similarly given by mit. At the beginning of each period, the society’s neighbors
raid it for R slaves, and nothing can prevent this. Initial conditions can be chosen so that Pt is
always greater than R/α. There is no voluntary migration across societies; agents who leave will
be enslaved by their neighbors.
3.1.1. Egalitarianism. Under egalitarianism, there are no land rights and no slavery. Both the elite
and the non-elite agents that remain after the society is raided receive average product:
piEt = m
E
t =
( A
Pt −R
)α
.(5)
3.1.2. Free labor. Under free labor, the elite encloses a fraction θ of the land, creating rights over
it. They hire non-elite agents at a competitive wage wt. The elite’s problem is:
piFt = max
Lt∈[0,Pt−R]
{(θA)αL1−αt − wtLt}.(6)
Non-elite agents not hired continue to work the remaining land communally, receiving income
mFt =
(
(1−θ)A
Pt−R−Lt
)α
. Equilibrium is achieved in the labor market when the wage (equal to the
marginal product of labor on the elite’s estate) is equal to the average product on the unenclosed
land. This will be true when:
(1− α)(θA)αL−αt =
( (1− θ)A
Pt −R− Lt
)α
⇒ Lt = (1− α)
1
α θ
(1− θ) + (1− α) 1α θ
(Pt −R) ≡ σ(Pt −R)(7)
⇒ wt = mFt = (1− α)(θA)α(σ(Pt −R))−α(8)
Substituting (7) and (8) into (6), the elite’s payoff is:
piFt = αθ
ασ1−αAα(Pt −R)1−α(9)
3.1.3. Slavery. Under slavery, the elite encloses a fraction θ of the land, creating rights over it.
They raid their neighbors for slaves, at an elastic cost r,6 which includes the cost of guarding the
slaves and feeding them while they are used in production. It is assumed for simplicity that free
workers will not work alongside slaves. Slaves do not reproduce.
The elite’s problem is:
6It is assumed the elite’s holding is small enough relative to its neighbors’ population that it does not face the
possibility of enslaving the entire neighboring population.
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piSt = max
St
{(θA)αS1−αt − rSt}.(10)
Solving for the elite’s preferred number of slaves, the elite’s payoff is:
piSt = α
[1− α
r
] 1−α
α
θA.(11)
The population receives the average product on the unenclosed land:
mSt =
((1− θ)A
Pt −R
)α
.(12)
3.1.4. Comparing payoffs. Define:
Ψ(Pt) =
[ r
1− α
]1/ασ
θ
(Pt −R),(13)
Ω(Pt) =
( 1
αθ
) 1
1−α
( r
1− α
) 1
α
(Pt −R)−
α
1−α ,(14)
and:
Φ =
1
αθασ1−α
.(15)
These partition the (A,Pt) space into three sets:
SE = {(A,Pt) ∈ R2+ : (A,Pt) /∈ SS ∪ SF },
SS = {(A,Pt) ∈ R2+ : A ≥ max{Ψ(Pt),Ω(Pt)},
SF = {(A,Pt) ∈ R2+ : Pt ≥ Φ +R and A ≤ Ψ(Pt)}.
(16)
These define the elite’s institutional preferences:
Proposition 1. Elite preferences over the three institutions are determined by A and Pt such that:
I. Egalitarianism is weakly preferred when:
piEt ≥ max{piSt , piFt } ⇔ (A,Pt) ∈ SE .
II. Slavery is weakly preferred when:
piSt ≥ max{piEt , piFt } ⇔ (A,Pt) ∈ SS .
III. Free labor is weakly preferred when:
piFt ≥ max{piEt , piSt } ⇔ (A,Pt) ∈ SF .
Proof. (5) and (11) imply that piSt ≥ piEt iff A ≥ Ω(Pt). (9) and (11) imply that piSt ≥ piFt iff
A ≥ Ψ(Pt). (5) and (9) imply that piFt ≥ piEt iff Pt ≥ Φ +R. 
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These regions are depicted in Figure 1. Slavery is preferred when population is large enough
that the opportunity cost of coercion is low, but small enough that free labor is expensive. Greater
agricultural productivity overcomes the inefficiency of coercion. Population growth pushes down
the average product of land, making egalitarianism unattractive.
3.2. Dynamics. Population evolves according to:
Pt+1 = n
non-elite
t (Pt −R).(17)
Using (3), (5), (8), (12), and (17), population is constant when:
A =

(
q
β
) 1
α
(
Pt
(Pt−R)1−α
) 1
α ≡ LE(Pt) if (A,Pt) ∈ SE(
q
β(1−α)
) 1
α σ
θ
(
Pt
(Pt−R)1−α
) 1
α ≡ LF (Pt) if (A,Pt) ∈ SF(
q
β
) 1
α 1
1−θ
(
Pt
(Pt−R)1−α
) 1
α ≡ LS(Pt) if (A,Pt) ∈ SS
(18)
If A > LS(Pt) under slavery, Pt is rising. If A < L
S(Pt) under slavery, Pt is falling. If A > L
E(Pt)
under egalitarianism, Pt is rising. If A < L
E(Pt) under egalitarianism, Pt is falling. If A > L
F (Pt)
under free labor, Pt is rising. If A < L
F (Pt) under free labor, Pt is falling.
Define:
AΦΨ,Ω =
( r
1− α
) 1
α
( σ
θΦ
)
,(19)
AFΦ =
( q
β(1− α)
) 1
α σ
θ
(Φ +R
Φ1−α
) 1
α
(20)
ASΦ =
( q
β
) 1
α 1
1− θ
(Φ +R
Φ1−α
) 1
α
(21)
AΦΨ,Ω is the level of A at which Ψ(Pt) and Ω(Pt) intersect Pt = Φ + R. A
F
Φ is the level of A at
which LF (Pt) intersects Pt = Φ + R. A
S
Φ is the level of A at which L
S(Pt) intersects Pt = Φ + R.
The dynamics in (18) determine what steady states will exist:
Proposition 2. Steady states.
I. So long as A is below a cutoff AE(α, β, θ, q, r, R), there is a steady state under egalitarianism.
II. If AFΦ ≤ AΦΨ,Ω and A is above a cutoff AF (α, β, θ, q, r, R), then a steady state under free labor
may exist.
III. If ASΦ ≥ AΦΨ,Ω and A is above a cutoff AS(α, β, θ, q, r, R), then there is a steady state under
slavery.
Proof. So long as A is low enough, it will obviously intersect LE(Pt) in SE . AFΦ ≤ AΦΨ,Ω ensures
LF (Pt) is flat enough to intersect SF . If AF is chosen as the level of A at which LF (Pt) intersects
Pt = Φ + R, above this the intersection of A and L
F (Pt) may occur in SF . Finally, ASΦ ≥ AΦΨ,Ω
ensures LS(Pt) is steep enough to intersect SS . If AS is chosen as the level of A at which LS(Pt)
intersects Ω(Pt), for any A ≥ AS , the intersection of A and LS(Pt) will occur in SS . 
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An example with a steady state under free labor is depicted in Figure 1.
3.3. Polygyny. Assume now that “wives” are an input into the production of children. Following
Tertilt (2005), the cost of producing nt children using Wt wives is now qn
2
t /Wt. If the purchase
price of a wife is bt, the total cost of nt children borne by Wt wives will be btWt + qn
2
t /Wt. Each
member of the elite and of the non-abducted non-elite population has h sisters who he sells at the
market price of bt. With a balanced sex ratio, h would equal 1. Payment of bride price to the
brother simplifies the model by removing receipt of bride price as a motivation for fertility.
The cost-minimizing choice of Wt for an agent taking bt as given will be
√
(q/bt)nt. The cost-
minimizing choice of wives implies that there is a linear marginal cost of children equal to 2
√
btq.
If an agent has income It, his optimal number of children will be βIt/(2
√
btq), which implies that
his demand for wives is βIt/(2bt). Under institutional i, elite income is pi
i
t + bth, while non-elite
income is mit + bth. Since the elite has zero mass, total demand in the market for wives is:
β
2bt
[
mit + hbt
]
(Pt −R).(22)
The total supply of wives is given by h(Pt − R). In equilibrium, bt is set by the intersection of
total demand with total supply, where:
bit =
β
(2− β)hm
i
t.(23)
Polygyny exists when the elite has more wives than members of the population, i.e when β(piit +
bth)/(2bt) > β(m
i
t + bth)/(2bt) or pi
i
t > m
i
t. The addition of polygyny will not qualitatively change
the elite’s preferences over institutions.7 Under egalitarianism, the elite’s income will be the same
as that of the non-elite, and so polygyny will not exist. Under free labor, the condition that
Pt ≥ Φ + R ensures that the elite’s income will be greater than that of the non-elite, and so
polygyny will exist. Under slavery, the condition that A > Ω(Pt) similarly ensures that the elite
has more wives. Inequality is a precondition for polygyny. This is a revision of the land-abundance
interpretation of African history.
7Under institutional setting i, if the elite receives income piit and the equilibrium bride price is b
i
t, the elite’s maximized
utility will be equal to:
V it = (1− β) ln
(
piit − 2
√
bitqn
∗
t
)
+ β ln(n∗t )
= (1− β) ln
(
piit − 2
√
bitq
β
2
√
bitq
piit
)
+ β ln
( β
2
√
bitq
piit
)
= ln(piit)− β
2
ln(bit) +K,
where K is a constant. Thus, institution i will be preferred to institution j if V it ≥ V jt , or:
ln(piit)− β
2
ln(bit) ≥ ln(pijt )−
β
2
ln(bjt)
⇒ pi
i
t
pijt
≥
( bit
bjt
) β
2
.
From (23), bit/b
j
t = m
i
t/m
j
t . The ratios m
i
t/m
j
t are constants independent of A and Pt. While the definitions of Φ, Ω,
and Ψ must be adjusted to include these constants, their general shapes will not change.
11
3.4. Two tests of the model. Two implications of the model are tested in Section 4:
I. Increasing (exogenous) A predicts the existence of slavery, polygyny and rights over land.
II. Polygyny and land rights exist when (endogenous) Pt is high; slavery exists at intermediate
Pt.
Rights over land and polygyny exist under both slavery and free labor. A ≥ AF is necessary
for a steady state to exist under free labor. Since AF is a nonlinear function of model parameters
that are not observed in the data, a matrix of geographic controls X is used to proxy for AF by
assuming:
AF ≈ 1
δ0
(−X ′λ0 − 0),(24)
where δ0 and λ0 are regression coefficients and 0 is an error term. The probability that a steady
state exists under free labor (i.e. with land rights and polygyny) is:
Pr(Steady state in SF ) = Pr(0 ≥ −δ0A−X ′λ0).(25)
If 0 ∼ N(0, 1), this can be estimated as a probit. Similarly, A ≥ AS is necessary for a steady
state to exist under slavery. Following similar logic, the probability of a steady state with slavery
is:
Pr(Steady state in SS) = Pr(1 ≥ −δ1A−X ′λ1).(26)
Again, if 1 ∼ N(0, 1), this can be estimated as a probit.
Land rights and polygyny exist under free labor and slavery, i.e. when Pt ≥ min{Φ+R,Ω−1(At)} =
min{Φ+R,Ω−1(A,A0, P0, t)}. Again using X as a proxy, the probability that land rights or polyg-
yny exist for an observed A and Pt is:
Pr(Land Rights, Polygyny) = Pr(2 ≥ −δ2iPt − δ2iiA−X ′λ2).(27)
If 2 ∼ N(0, 1), this can be estimated using a probit. Finally, if At is large enough, slavery will
exist when Ψ−1(At) ≥ Pt ≥ Ω−1(At). Using X, this is equivalent to stating that slavery exists if:
δ3iPt + δ3iiA+X
′λ3 + 3 ≥ 0 and δ4iPt + δ4iiA+X ′λ4 + 4 ≥ 0.(28)
If (3,−4) ∼ N(0,Λ), this is the Poirier (1980) partially unobserved bivariate probit model.
However, because this could not be implemented on the actual data, the tests used look for an
inverted-U relationship between population density and slavery.8
8There are no elements of X that can be excluded a priori from either of the two equations in the partially unobserved
bivariate probit model. Without an exclusion restriction of this type, the model may not be identified on actual data,
as is the case with the data used below.
12
4. Cross-sectional evidence
This section implements both tests of the model described in Section 3.4. The model correctly
predicts the existence of land rights, slavery and polygyny where A is highest, and land rights and
polygyny are positively correlated with population density. Slavery, however, is positively related
to population density – it does not exist only at intermediate levels. This may be understood within
the model as due to Africa’s disease environment or to its overall sparse population, as discussed
below. Section 4.1 describes the data used and presents summary statistics. Section 4.2 lays out
the empirical strategy, and Section 4.3 presents the results.
4.1. Data. Two types of data are used to test the ability of the model to explain institutional
differemces across societies within Africa. The first is Murdock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas. Pub-
lished in 29 installments of the journal Ethnology between 1962 and 1980, the Atlas is a database
of 1267 societies from around the world.9 It contains categorical variables describing several insti-
tutional and cultural features of these societies at the time of first contact with Europeans. 531
African societies are used for the analysis.10
Six variables from the Ethnographic Atlas are used to construct binary dependent variables, and
summary statistics for these are given in Table 3.11 Indicators are used for whether any land rights
or slavery exist. Two measures are used for polygyny. The first is a direct indicator for whether
polygyny exists. Because there is not much variation in this outcome, “willingness to pay” for
wives is measured by using an indicator for whether consideration is given in return for a bride (a
non-token bride-price, labor service, or another female relative). Two measures are used of state
power – whether there is more than level of jurisdiction above the local (“state stratification”), and
whether class stratification exists among freemen.
The second type of data used includes features of the natural environment. These are joined
to the data from the Ethnographic Atlas using the “Tribal Map of Africa” from Murdock (1959).
Sources, definitions, and details of the matching procedure are given in Appendix A. Summary
statistics are presented in Table 3. Two of these controls are of particular importance. The first,
agricultural suitability, is based on Fischer et al.’s (2002) measure of combined climate, soil and
terrain slope constrains. This is re-scaled to lie between 0 and 1, with larger values indicating an
absence of environmental constrains on agriculture. This is treated as a proxy for the variable A in
9A revised version of the Atlas has been made available for download in SPSS format by J. Patrick Gray at
http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/˜drwhite/worldcul/EthnographicAtlasWCRevisedByWorldCultures.sav. This is the ver-
sion used for the present study.
10The Guanche, an extinct people of the Canary Islands, are dropped because they are observed more than 300 years
earlier than any of the other groups in the African sample barring Ancient Egypt, which is similarly dropped. Dates
of observation are missing for the Bomvana and Betsileo. The Bomvana are recoded to 1850, to match the date
of observation for the other Xhosa, while the Betsileo are recoded to 1900, the modal date for the other Malagasy
societies in the data.
11These are: V74: Inheritance Rule for Real Property (Land); V70: Type of Slavery; V6: Mode to Marriage (Pri-
mary); V9: Marial Composition: Monogamy and Polygamy; V33: Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond Local Community,
and; V66: Class Stratification. The definitions of the binary variables are: 1) Land rights exist if V74 6=1, 2) slavery
exists if V70 > 1, 3) polygyny exists if V96=1, 4) consideration for bride exists if V6=1 or V6=2 or V6=5, 5) state
stratification exists if V33>2, and 6) class stratification exists if V66>1.
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the model. The second is population density in 1960, published by the United Nations Environment
Programme. This is treated as a proxy for Pt in the model.
12 These are plotted on in Figure 2.
The other controls listed in Table 3 are included as proxies for the unobserved cutoffs described
in Section 3.4. These are nonlinear functions of α, β, q, r, and θ. Elevation is related to the
disease environment, and hence the cost of children (q). It also affects the range of available crops
and technologies, and hence α. McCann (1999, p. 38-39), for example, notes that the Ethiopian
highlands were a unique source of crops such as teff and supported both animal husbandry and
use of the plough. Precipitation determines what crops can be grown, shaping α. African growing
seasons and diseases are constrained by the seasonal availability of moisture (McCann, 1999, p. 15-
18). Areas with low rainfall are also those most susceptible to drought (Bloom and Sachs, 1998,
p. 222); β and r accounting for storage needs will be greater.
Temperature affects the physical cost of effort (Landes, 1998, p. 4), and hence r and β. In
hostile environments, it is more difficult for slaves to flee; r is lower.13 Temperature affects q
through nutrition and disease (Bloom and Sachs, 1998, p. 228). Distances from the coast and from
Lake Victoria proxy for water-borne diseases that affect q (e.g. Miguel and Kremer (2004)). These
distances also capture the presence of trade, which affects both α and β through what goods are
bought and sold, and the cost of slavery (r) through what uses exist for slaves and whether they
can be punished by sale for export (Lovejoy, 2000, p. 4). Proximity to markets also affects the
benefit of children (hence β) through their use as substitutes for insurance and savings (Bloom and
Sachs, 1998, p. 249).
The suitability of the environment for malaria affects q through child mortality and r via slave
mortality. It may also alter the physical cost of effort in adults (Gallup and Sachs, 2001, p. 94-
95). Suitability for tsetse makes the survival of draught animals and cattle difficult, shaping α.
Kjekshus (1977, p. 51) writes that the “overwhelming feature in the study of cattle-keeping in East
Africa is the presence of the tsetse fly.” Trypanosomiases also affect human mortality, and hence
q, and the ability to use cavalry (and thus r). Webb (1995) cites this as a decisive factor in the
history of the Western Sahel. Ruggedness, following Nunn and Puga (2007), is related to the cost of
capturing slaves, and hence r. Crop dummies are taken as exogenous determinants of the available
technologies (α). Absolute latitudes north and south of the equator and the date at which the
society was first observed are also included as controls.
4.2. Specification. The first prediction of the model is that raising A will make it possible for
steady states to exist with land rights, polygyny, or slavery. This is tested by estimating:
yi = δr + βAAi +X
′
iγ + i,(29)
12This is reasonable insofar as the relative distribution of population within Africa has been stable over time across
regions as large as those used as observations. Population density in 1960 and 2000 have a correlation coefficient of
0.92 and their logs have a correlation coefficient of 0.97, which suggests that this is a fair assumption. All regressions
also account for the date of observation, which will capture growth effects.
13Isaacman et al. (1980, p. 598) makes a similar point in discussing the difficulties faced by refugees who fled colonial
rule in northern Mozambique.
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where yi is an outcome of interest for ethnic group i, δr is a vector of dummies for the fifteen
regions in the Ethnographic Atlas, Ai is the measure of agricultural suitability based on Fischer
et al. (2002), Xi is a matrix of geographical controls, and i ∼ N(0, 1) is random error. (29) is
estimated as a probit, and observations are weighted by estimated population in 1960. This is
done to avoid giving smaller groups undue influence in the results. Standard errors are clustered
by region. I expect that βA > 0 for land rights, slavery, and polygyny.
The second implication of the model is that land rights and polygyny exist at higher levels of
Pt, while slavery exists at intermediate levels of Pt. These are tested by estimating:
yi = δr + βP ln(Pi) + βAAi +X
′
iγ + i,(30)
and
yi = δr + βP1Pi + βP2P
2
i + βAAi +X
′
iγ + i,(31)
where yi, δr, Ai, Xi, and i are defined as in (29). Pi is population density in 1960. These are
also estimated as probit models, with observations weighted by estimated population and standard
errors clustered by region. I expect that βP > 0 for land rights, βP > 0 for polygyny and the cost
of wives, and that βP1 > 0 and βP2 < 0 for slavery.
Finally, a test for neighbor effects is implemented by estimating a spatial autoregressive (SAR)
model:
yi = α+ ρWiyi−1 + βAAi +X ′iγ + i.(32)
Here, α is a constant, Wi is an N × N spatial weight matrix, in which each entry Wij is an
indicator for whether observation i borders observation j, normalized so that its rows sum to 1 or
0. yi−1 is a vector of outcomes for the other observations. ρ captures whether the institutional
outcome of one group will affect its neighbor’s institutions. ρ may alternatively be interpreted as
a measure of localized unobservables. Because of the spatial lag, standard probit estimates will be
inconsistent. The model is estimated using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo SAR probit estimator
described by LeSage and Pace (2009, p. 283-289).
4.3. Results. Table 4 presents estimates of (29), (30) and (31). Table 5 gives estimates of (32).
Results are discussed by type of outcome.
4.3.1. Land Rights. As predicted by the model, an increase in A predicts the existence of rights over
land. When only the proxy Ai and a dummy for the North and Saharan regions (taken together)
are included, the estimated coefficient on Ai is positive and significant. As more controls and
regional dummies are included, the estimated coefficient on agricultural suitability becomes larger.
36 observations are lost, because all societies for which trees are their principal crop have land
rights. This suggests that the significance of the results is not due to correlation of agricultural
suitability with other unobservable variables that make the existence of land rights more likely. If
these unobservable features have similar correlations with agricultural suitability as the observable
15
variables, including them would strengthen the estimated effect of agricultural suitability on land
rights (Altonji et al., 2005). The results concerning Pt also confirm the predictions for land rights.
This is not a causal effect; as an endogenous variable, it is correlated with land rights as the model
predicts. The estimate of ρ is negative. A society with land rights discourages its neighbors from
having rights over land. In the model, if neighbors switch from egalitarianism to slavery, creating
rights over land in their own societies, this will increase R. This raises the population threshold
above which free labor is preferred to slavery, because more people are drawn out each period.
An explanation from outside the model is that, if secure rights encourage in-migration, this will
depopulate neighboring regions, delaying the development of land rights in these.
4.3.2. Slavery. The model’s predictions for slavery confirm a restricted version of the model. While
the point estimate on Ai is positive when only a North/Sahara dummy is included, it is not sig-
nificant. Once other controls and regional dummies are added, this effect grows in magnitude
and becomes significant, supporting the predictions of the model. This suggests that agricultural
suitability is correlated with both observed and unobserved features that make slavery less likely,
and so the estimated impact is not due solely to omitted variables bias. While the log of popula-
tion density is positively correlated with the existence of slavery, there is no significant quadratic
correlation of slavery with population density.14 This need not imply a rejection of the model, for
two reasons. First, the disease environment in Africa may be so severe, and q so high, that the
zero-population growth locus LF (Pt) is too steep to intersect the free labor region, SF . Popula-
tion simply cannot grow to the point where free labor replaces slavery. Second, Africa is sparsely
populated. There may not be enough densely-populated societies in the data with relatively low
agricultural suitability to identify the relationship statistically. Both of these fit very well with the
land abundance view of African history. Positive spill-overs exist in slavery; if a society uses slaves
it encourages its neighbors to do the same. This may be because it is more difficult for a slave to
escape to a neighboring slave society, lowering r. It may also, outside the model, reflect the military
value of slaves and the need for a society to defend itself from neighboring militarized societies.
4.3.3. Polygyny. As in the extension in Section 3.3, both payment of consideration for a bride and
the existence of polygyny are more likely in locations where agricultural suitability is high. 38
observations are gained for payment of consideration in the second column because all societies
in the North or Sahara offer more than a token price for wives. 86 are lost for polygyny since all
societies cultivating roots and tubers are polygynous. Both are positively correlated with population
density, though this is not significant. This runs contrary to the conventional arguments in the
literature on African history, particularly those of Goody (1969) and Tambiah and Goody (1973).
Inequality between men is a precondition for polygyny, and so the positive correlation between class
stratification and population density suggests that polygyny and payment of bride-price are not
possible in the most egalitarian, sparsely-settled societies. The impact of agricultural suitability
disappears (though it is still marginally present for the payment of consideration) in the spatial
regressions because these results are sensitive to the weighting of observations; this is not surprising,
14I have also tested whether population splines or quantiles reveal a significant inverted-U pattern in groups of 3, 5
and 10. They do not, and these results are not reported.
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given the lack of variation in these outcomes. There is no evidence that marital institutions show
correlation across space.
4.3.4. State Power. Neither state nor class stratification are related to Ai; while both measures of
state strength are correlated with population density, intrinsic agricultural productivity does not
appear to be one of their systematic determinants. Validating Herbst (2000), population density
is positively correlated with both measures of state strength. State and class stratification display
positive neighbor effects. This may reflect the need for societies to defend themselves against their
organized neighbors. This may also be due to direct institutional spillovers. Oral tradition, for
example, states that the institution of kingship was transferred directly from Ife to Benin during
the thirteenth century (Ryder, 1965). Similarly, the formation of the Swazi and Lesotho states was
a direct response to the rise of Zulu power during the mfecane (Maddox, 2006, p. 114).
In sum, the model correctly predicts that land rights and polygyny existed in pre-colonial Africa
where population and agricultural suitability were greatest. As in the model, slavery existed where
agricultural suitability was high, but population was positively correlated with slavery. This is
consistent with the literature’s characterization of Africa as land abundant. Population could not
expand in the African environment to the point where free labor would replace slavery. While
state power was correlated with population density, its existence was not systematically based on
agricultural suitability.
5. Evidence from one society
The model in Section 3 and the statistical evidence in Section 4 have shown that land abundance
is a powerful tool for explaining differences in institutions across societies in pre-colonial Africa.
This section traces the implications of land abundance in a particular Nigerian society, the Egba,
over the period 1830 to 1914. This permits for a more nuanced understanding of what institutions
such as land rights and slavery entailed in practice. Since longitudinal data on institutions in
pre-colonial Africa do not exist, looking at one society allows the development of institutions to
be traced over a long period. Other features of Egba society can be interpreted in terms of model
parameters.
Section 5.1 provides historical background. Section 5.2 outlines the sources used. Section 5.3
describes property rights in land; these were poorly defined, while markets for land were thin.
The exceptions to this pattern – land sales and land disputes – are also discussed in this section.
Section 5.4 turns to labor, noting the absence of a market for free labor, the use of slaves, and the
importance of wives and dependents. Section 5.5 looks at capital, noting the difficulty in borrowing
without land as collateral. This was eased after 1890 by the arrival of cocoa and kola.
5.1. Historical Background. The Egba are a Yoruba-speaking group, presently located in the
central portions of Ogun State. These are depicted in Figure 3. The Egba settled as refugees at the
site of Abeokuta in 1830, and remained formally independent from British rule until 1914. Political
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power before 1914 lay at the more decentralized level of the township,15 and was divided among
the the olorogun (war chiefs), ogboni (civil chiefs), ode (hunters), and parakoyi (trade chiefs).
In the mid-nineteenth century, the Egba cultivated maize, cotton, yams, cassava and beans,
supplementing these with other crops.16 These were intercropped and planted in heaps.17 Palm
products were their principal exports, and the Egba were among the first Yoruba groups to become
involved in this trade.18 Cocoa spread from Lagos after 1890 due to the efforts of merchants and
demobilized soldiers seeking new opportunities.19 Many early planters were Christians, supported
by evangelists, Lagos businesses, and Agege planters such as J.K. Coker, who had a 2,000 acre
farm and employed more than 200 laborers.20 Kola trees were also introduced through Lagos by
repatriated slaves and Lagos Christians, with British encouragement.21
Situated close to Lagos, the Egba were important in the nineteenth century trade and politics
of the city, and were an early focus of missionary efforts.22 The representatives of the Egba United
Government (EUG)23 highlighted the peculiar institutional development of the Egba in their testi-
mony to the West African Lands Committee (WALC) in 1913 by giving answers different from the
other Yoruba representatives, in particular claiming that sale of land was a long-standing custom.24
Mabogunje (1961) attributes this to the unusual settlement pattern of the Egba, who began as a
densely populated group of refugees and expanded slowly outwards from Abeokuta over the next
seventy years.
5.2. Sources. Court records are a commonly used source for economic historians and Africanists.25
They make it possible to go beyond the idealized descriptions of institutions given other sources
and observe how they worked in practice. I have collected data on 541 Native Court cases involving
farmland that took place between 1902 and 1919.26 In addition, missionary records, travelers’
15The Egba townships correspond roughly to the villages occupied by the Egba before their removal to Abeokuta.
Estimates of the number of these townships vary; Burton (1863, p. 170) gives 150; Ajisafe (1924, p. 18) writes “not
less than three hundred”; Johnson (1921, p. 93) states 153; Fadipe (1970, p. 48) gives 145, Stone (1900, p. 38) gives
110, and Ward-Price (1939, p. 87) states 70.
16See Barber (1857, p. 100), Burton (1863, p. 62) and Delany (1861, p. 33).
17Burton (1863), p. 62.
18Lynn (1997), p. 41.
19Berry (1975), p. 51.
20Agiri (1972), p. 164.
21Agiri (1977), p. 7-8.
22Tucker (1853)
23The central government of the independent Egba from 1893 to 1914; the name “Egba United Government” was
not adopted until 1898.
24Mabogunje (1961), p. 258.
25See, for example, Dickerman (1984), Chanock (1985), Dickerman et al. (1990), Mann and Roberts (1991), Moore
(1986), Ogilvie (2003), or Roberts (2005).
26Two sets of Native Court records are used for this study. The first is taken from the Egba Council Records (ECR)
deposited in the National Archives, Abeokuta (NAA), and contains Civil and Criminal Record Books mostly from the
period 1899-1904. The second is housed in the Hezekiah Oluwasanmi Library at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife.
From this collection, I have used Civil Judgment Books from the Ake “A” and “B” Grade Courts, the Ake Central
Court, the Abeokuta Mixed Court, and the Abeokuta Native Court of Appeal. Other cases from these collections
(for example, suits relating to urban land, manumission certificates or divorce) are cited in the text, but not included
in the sample used for the quantitative analysis.
Histories of the Native Courts have been provided by Adewoye (1977) for Southern Nigeria as a whole and Pallinder-
Law (1974) (specifically, p. 84-87, 106-113, 123-127, 133, 142-146, and 152-153) for Egbaland. Before 1904, the court
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descriptions, official correspondence and private letters are used as sources of historical evidence;
these are taken from published sources, the Church Missionary Society (CMS) Archive, the Rhodes’
House Library (RHL), the National Archives of the UK (NAUK), and the National Archives of
Nigeria in Ibadan (NAI) and Abeokuta (NAA). Ten elderly Egba men and women also served as
informants.27
Summary statistics for the court cases are presented in Table 6. Only two thirds of the case
records are complete.28 Events are mis-counted due both to disputants’ selective presentation of
facts and to this incompleteness. In trespass cases, the amount claimed is for the damage done,
while in recovery cases it is for the entire value of the land. Cocoa had been planted on roughly a
quarter of the plots, and kola was planted on little over a tenth. Many plots had been pawned at
some point in their history, and more than a tenth had been sold. This last measure is problematic,
since “sale” is used as an accusation of wrongdoing and as another word for pawning.
Several strategies for defending claims are also evident in Table 6; boundaries were either made
by the participants, the township chiefs, or the “villagers.” Many disputes were taken to the chiefs
before coming to court. Jujus (objects with supernatural power) such as aya or mariwo were placed
in a farm to prevent other parties from entering; these provided a signal that the land was under
dispute, and a fear of supernatural punishment if ignored. An opponent could also be driven from
the land. This is a selected sample, and so these numbers are clearly not representative of all Egba
farms. Still, it is clear that by 1919 the cocoa boom was underway, pawning of land was common,
sale of farm land existed, and Egba farmers used a variety of strategies to defend their claims.
records that survive consist of the Alake and council of the EUG exercising their judicial authority. While courts
for each of the four Egba sections were established in 1901, the non-Ake courts were abolished in 1904. The Ake
court was then moved into a new building, to lessen the Alake’s influence over its decisions. Cases used for this
study from 1904 and later are primarily from this court. Its judges were literate Egba, appointed by the EUG (by
the Egba Native Authority after 1914), and it had both civil and criminal jurisdiction. It is clear from the records
that the courts, while empowered to enforce unwritten “native law and custom,” followed a judicial process that
was “essentially arbitrational, aimed at restoring harmony by negotiating a settlement acceptable to both parties”
(Pallinder-Law, 1974, p. 84). If both litigants were closely related, the court might remit the case to be settled
amicably “at home.” Similarly, while “private” courts were ostensibly illegal, it is clear that the ogboni (civil chiefs)
continued to hear the majority of cases, and that only those they could not settle were taken to the Ake court in
Abeokuta. The Alake was frequently accused of interfering in the court’s operation before 1914.
A typical record begins by noting the names of the litigants and either their home villages or township affiliations,
as well as the number of the case. A complete record has been transcribed as Appendix B. The plaintiff’s cause of
action and claim for damages are also given in the header, alongside the farm’s location (e.g. “at Kori Ogude”); the
majority of claims are for either recovery of farmland or damages for trespassing and reaping crops. The testimony is
recorded in English longhand, though it is likely the participants spoke mostly in Yoruba. The judgments delivered
usually range from a sentence to a short paragraph, stating how the land is to be divided and what damages are to
be paid.
27These interviews were conducted, recorded and translated from Yoruba by Joseph Ayodukun. Transcripts of these
interviews are available upon request. Because the time period of this study predates living memory, these capture
oral tradition and normative rules more than historical fact.
28Cases are often adjourned so that parties can call further witness or so that the land can be “inspected.” Available
records are frequently incomplete, since a case may be resumed in another judgment book which no longer survives,
or may be continued from a similarly non-extant book. Inspection of the land enters the court records only as the
verbal report of the officer who conducted it. At these public meetings, “villagers,” elders and chiefs were called to
give evidence and identify boundaries. The court invariably takes the reports of these examinations as declarations
of fact.
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5.3. Land. In 1911, Lugard estimated that the whole of the Egba Division had an area of 1869
square miles and a population of 265,000 - a density of 142 per square mile.29 This is less dense
than present-day Coˆte d’Ivoire or Kenya. Even at this intermediate density, free land was accessible
to independent farmers, who cultivated fewer than five acres annually.30 In 1877, the missionary
James Johnson reported that individuals could acquire land for farming freely if they developed it
from forest, or in return for token payments.31 Grants were traditionally either tito32 or fifun. If
the gift was tito, the owner of a piece of “virgin” forest received presents from the grantee. When
the recipient cleared the forest, he became its absolute owner.33 Although clearing required labor
(Forde et al. (1946, p. 92, 113-114) estimate 48 to 92 man-days per acre), this was spread out over
the first three years. Trees were burned after felling, with the roots left in place, and two maize
crops could be planted during the first year.34 The Yoruba proverb that “a farmer’s period of
hunger is three months” (the length of time needed for the first maize crop to mature) is evidence
that clearing costs were not an insurmountable barrier to taking new land from forest.35 A man
who wished to take forest in his own village could call on the help of one of the co-operative work
groups described in Section 5.4. A migrant would receive a fifun grant of already cleared land
known as igboro or irapa. Under the rules of the mawoke (“don’t look up”) system, he was not
permitted to plant permanent crops, to reap the fruit of trees on the land, or to alienate it.36 Fadipe
(1970, p. 176) states that fifun grants were intended to be temporary, enabling the recipient “to
have the means of subsistence at his disposal, with the minimum delay, while the forest land that
was granted him was being cleared and prepared for cultivation.”
The payments given for such grants were typically small, and the descriptions given by Folarin
(1939, p. 74-75), Partridge (1911, p. 428-433), or Lloyd (1962, p. 262-267) make them appear more
formal than they actually were. Statements in the court records rarely state that any conditions
were attached; the grant to Lukosi in Appendix B is an example. Even for planting cocoa or
kola, land could be acquired virtually without cost. Early planters obtained their land without
payments, before the owners were aware of its value. After 1885, many Lagos Egba often obtained
free grants from the landowning families near Agege and Ilu.37 While Ward-Price (1939, p. 90-93)
reported that land for planting cocoa sold at roughly £3 and two bottles of gin per acre during
the 1930s, much had already been given away and the chiefs could no longer obtain any revenues
from it.38 Many migrants chose to plant at Otta because an individual could farm a piece of land
29WALC (1916a), p. 24.
30The Olofin of Ilogbo estimated that his subjects cultivated three acres each in 1902 (NAUK, CO 147/162, enc in
20 Oct, 1902: Acting Governor to Chamberlain).
31Agiri (1974), p. 467.
32Partridge (1911, p. 429) uses the term Egan, meaning “forest”.
33Folarin (1939), p. 74.
34Ant (1902), p. 319.
35Fadipe (1970), p. 177.
36Folarin (1939), p. 74-75.
37NAI, Fowler “A Report on the Lands of the Colony Districts,” p. 30.
38All money values are nominal. Following the UK retail price index from EH.net, the retail price index in Britain
over the course of this study started at 96.55 in 1830, ended at 102.5 in 1914, bottomed out at 83.81 in 1851, and
peaked at 112.95 in 1867. Misstatements of value due to the use of nominal values will be less than 20% in either
direction. The notation used is the standard notation that was used for pounds, shillings, and pence before the pound
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while serving a master and obtain ownership of a plot if he settled permanently.39 One interviewee
reported that when his grandfather obtained land at Ilogbo all that had been asked for was prayer
wine.40
This section discusses the evidence that Egba land use and tenure were driven by the abundance
of land. The market for land was thin. Agriculture economized on labor and few investments were
made. Property rights were ambiguously defined. Land sales and disputes, however, both existed.
Mabogunje (1958, 1959, 1961) has argued that Egba land tenure was altered by their settlement
pattern; his argument is reinterpreted here as a response to changes in the land-labor ratio. In
addition, even as land in general was abundant, specific pieces of land had particular value.
5.3.1. Thin land markets. Because land was cheaply available, markets for it were thin. Burton
(1863, p. 96), after visiting Abeokuta in 1860, wrote that there were two ideas “incomprehensible to
Europeans, but part and parcel of the African mind. The first ... is that a slave-born man is a slave
for ever. The second is the non-alienation of land.” In an 1878 schedule of property for the CMS
Yoruba Mission,41 none of the land held in Egba territory was declared to have any value apart
from the buildings on it. At Osiele, it was noted that “land property cannot be estimated here
as to the value, because the practice of selling land is not customary in this village.” While Egba
officials were testifying that land sales were a long-standing custom, many Egba questioned their
legitimacy. The defendant in a 1905 suit42 stated that “we Arawo people refused to see any of our
land sold, we agree that any body can till the ground but not to sell it.” Similarly, the inspecting
officer in a 1915 case told the court that “Itoko people have objection to their lands being sold.”43
The terms on which land was leased to the British also reflected its low market value; in 1914,
the colonial government held ten plots of land on lease from the Egba Native Authority totalling a
little over 26,000 acres and on which annual rents were below £600 – less than a shilling an acre.44
5.3.2. Extensive agriculture. Egba agriculture economized on labor but not on land. Land was
cultivated for five or six years, followed by five to six years of fallow, and then two or three more
years of cultivation before a long fallow of up to twenty years.45 Besides cocoa and kola, there were
no fixed investments made and no fertilizers used. Crop rotations in which maize and yams gave
way to water-yams during the end of the cultivation cycle adapted to deteriorating productivity
rather than restoring it.46
When a plot was exhausted, it was common for farmers to relinquish their claims and rely on
the memories of those left behind in order to reassert them years later. In one suit, the defendant
Oyedele had been a small child when compelled to leave the farm during the Ado war.47 He
was decimalized in 1971. £1/2/3 denotes one pound, 2 shillings (s), and 3 pence (d). £1/2 denotes one pound, two
shillings. 1/2 denotes one shilling, two pence. £1 denotes one pound. 2s denotes two shillings. 3d denotes 3 pence.
39Agiri (1972), p. 176.
40Chief M. O. Adeyinka, Odofin of Africa General Totoro, 26 July, 2007. No 1 Totoro Street, Owu Abeokuta.
41CMS, CA2/O14 Buildings and Property.
42Ake Central Suit 209/1905.
43Abeokuta Civil Suit 403/1915.
44NAUK, CO 583/10, enc. in Feb 16, 1914: Lugard to Harcourt
45NAUK, CO 147/162, enc. in 20 Oct, 1902: Acting Governor to Chamberlain.
46Dennett (1910), p. 141.
47Ake “A” Civil Suit 235/1917. There was more than one Ado war; this was likely c. 1843 or 1853.
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returned around 1909, and came with a case of gin asking to be shown his father’s land. On finding
it occupied, he, according to the plaintiff, “began to point to any farm he met by the way, all which
he called his father’s when he was corrected by an old pawn of his father ... who took him to the
old site of his father’s farm which had long been taken by Itoko chiefs.”
One strategy for retaining control of abandoned land was to grant usufruct rights (such as reaping
palm nuts) to a “caretaker.” With time, however, the plot could fall into the hands of the caretaker
or his children. In a 1915 suit, the plaintiff Lawani had left land with the defendant’s father, a
half-brother. The defendant’s father planted kola trees prior to 1895.48 Though he had stated he
was “prepared to give pltf [plaintiff] out of it,” his daughter (the defendant) refused to honor the
promise. The court divided the land, ordering the plaintiff to compensate the defendant for the
kola trees that ended up in his possession.
5.3.3. Weakly defined land rights. With land freely available and extensive cultivation techniques,
property rights over land were poorly defined and rarely permanent. This was striking to Europeans.
Clarke (1871, p. 259) wrote that land was “held by possession and only so long as cultivated unless
it is vacated with a reserved right.”49 Campbell (1861, p. 35) recorded his impressions in greater
detail:
The tenure of property is as it is among civilized people, except as to land, which
is deemed common property; every individual enjoys the right of taking unoccupied
land, as much as he can use, wherever and whenever he pleases. It is deemed his
property as long as he keeps it in use; after that, it is again common property.
Clarke (1871, p. 260) described Yoruba farms has having the “unbroken appearances of a single
field,” as no fences were used and only a “small path” might exist to show where one farm ended
and another began. In actual fact, natural features such as streams and roads were taken as
boundaries, and porogun trees were planted as markers. These were not generally placed, however,
until a dispute had already arisen. Otherwise, it was not worthwhile. Egba land tenure was not
put down as a coherent set of rules until it became important to do so in negotiations with British
officials. Johnson (1921, p. 95-97), in his nationalist history, wrote that the “land laws of the Yoruba
country are simple and effective, there being no need of any complicated or elaborate laws,” while
admitting that these were “to be observed rather in the spirit than in the letter.”
The process by which land disputes were resolved was informal and often indeterminate. Gen-
erally, the bale (village head) was responsible for disputes arising within his compound.50 His
authority depended on his personality and was exercised in consultation with other household
members.51 Interviewees suggested that the importance of the bale (village head) derived from his
knowledge of the land in question and his personal authority:
48Abeokuta Civil Suit 578/1915.
49See Stone (1900, p. 21) for a similar observation.
50Stone (1900), p. 28.
51Blair (1937), p. 16.
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For household head it is usually the oldest which is believe to know the history of
the settlement and what belong to who in the settlement than anybody therefore
his statement about land is held as final.52
If the parties were not satisfied with the bale’s (village head’s) intervention, they could go to
the township chiefs, relegating the bale’s (village head’s) role to that of arbitrator.53 In nearly
a quarter of the sample cases, a previous attempt at settlement had been made before the local
chiefs. Disputes were not settled decisively, but were instead subject to ongoing renegotiation.
5.3.4. Land sales and land disputes. Although land markets were thin, the existence of land sales
was noted before the WALC. Similarly, some land was valuable enough to be disputed in court.
Mabogunje (1958, 1959, 1961) links the existence of land sales to the conditions under which
Abeokuta was settled in 1830 and the area around it occupied over the next century. During the
initial scramble for land, townships were asked to waive their rights so that newcomers could settle,
disrupting ogboni (civil chiefs’) claims in favor of family control.54 Households located dwellings in
the middle of their farms in order to lay claim to them.55 During the initial settlement, the only
land safe for farming was located in a small region bounded on the northeast by Osiele, on the
Southeast by Oba, and on the North by Aiyetoro.56 These are shown in Figure 3. In 1846, farms
were still confined to the immediate neighborhood of Abeokuta.57
“Behind the movements of the Egba armies,” Mabogunje (1959, p. 72) argues, “followed their
farmers.” By 1861, farms extended twenty or thirty miles from the town walls.58 By 1878 they
had stretched out towards Otta and occupied the territory between Owode and Mokoloki.59 Much
land in the South was still uncultivated in 1877, and expansion to the Northeast was impossible
before 1893.60 After this date, many of the oriles (the ruined sites of the original townships) were
reoccupied. The first re-settlers reported to the township chiefs and were made responsible for
dividing land among later settlers.61
Mabogunje’s argument is one in which the initial scramble for land created strategies of village
establishment that disrupted ogboni (civil chiefs’) control of land, but later reaffirmed it during the
reoccupation of the oriles (deserted villages). An alternative interpretation would view the Egba
case as a Boserupian response to an exogenous shock to population density. In the model, this is a
shift from SE to SS . Johnson (1921, p. 17) describes the original home of the Egba as having an
area of more than 1,000 square miles,62 while the area of initial settlement described by Mabogunje
52Interview: J. A. Adediran, 9 Aug, 2007.
53Blair (1937), p. 32.
54Mabogunje (1961), p. 266.
55Mabogunje (1958), p. 24.
56Mabogunje (1961), p. 260.
57Oroge (1971), p. 186.
58Oroge (1971), p. 189.
59Agiri (1974), p. 469.
60Mabogunje (1959), p. 74.
61Mabogunje (1958), p. 48-49.
62Specifically, he describes it as a parallelogram with its points at Ijaye, Olokemeji, Ibadan, and the coast.
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(1961) is only about 160 square miles in area.63 Observers put the population of Abeokuta in mid-
century between 60,000 and 150,000.64 This gives a range of reasonable density estimates ranging
from 375 to 938 per square mile. Even accounting for the upward bias that results from using the
population after twenty years of growth and in-migration, the ratio of men to land from 1830 to
1860 was much higher than at the end of the century.
In addition to Mabogunje’s sources, there is evidence that Egba farmers expanded outwards as
the risks due to war diminished. In 1863, the Governor of Lagos reported that “the natives of the
villages dare not cultivate far from their homes lest they should be kidnapped whilst labouring
on their farms, and their only protection is the impenetrable bush, which has now overrun again
immense tracts of land which but three years ago were covered with fine farms.”65 In 1893, fear
of Dahomey raids was still keeping the country west of Abeokuta clear of settlement.66 In 1893,
however, Halligey (1893, p. 31-32, 36) commented that the land between Abeokuta and Otta had,
“within the last few years, ... been largely cleared of its forest and thick brush in order to be put
in cultivation.”67
Evidence that the period of land scarcity altered Egba farming practices comes from Cyril
Punch’s 1902 tour of the Egba country, depicted in Figure 4.68 Three differences were still apparent
between the land-scarce region of initial settlement and those areas occupied later. First, farmers
near Abeokuta shortened their periods of fallow. Between Abeokuta and Aberu Agba, Punch re-
ported fallow lengths of 3-4 years, 5-6 years, and 4 years. Between Ijeun and Ashero (northeast of
Mokoloki), he reported three times that land was left fallow for 5-6 years. Second, Egba cultiva-
tors used intercropping more intensively on the exhausted soils nearer Abeokuta. Third, farmers
abandoned the long fallows that allowed the land to return to forest. Punch mentions indefinite or
very long fallow periods between Kajola (East of Onibode) and Aberu Agba, Ijeun and Asha, Asha
and Ilogbo, Coker’s farm and Ashero, and between Okenla and Itori. None of these are in the first
stretch from Abeokuta to Onibode, and only one is in the directly southern region where the Egba
made their first military expansions. He encountered little forest before Ijeun and between Okenla
and Itori.69 Punch himself believed that the Egba were expanding into “a belt adjoining the forest
63It is effectively an oval roughly ten miles by twenty.
64Barber (1857, p. 19), 80,000 c. 1845; Freeman (1844, p. 227), twice the size of Kumasi in 1842; Bowen (1857,
p. 106), 60,000 to 100,000 in 1850; Beecroft estimated the population at 300,000 in 1850, Hockin estimated the
population at 70,000 in 1866, Irving estimated it at 100,000 in 1862, and Forbes estimated it at 50,000 in 1848
according to Townsend (1887, p. 106, 154, 160); Campbell (1861, p. 33), more than 100,000 in 1860; Burton (1863,
p. 170), 150,000 in 1861 when the soldiers return. Mabogunje (1961, p. 260) gives three examples of missionaries who
put their estimates above 100,000 in private correspondence.
65CO 147/3, 5 Jan, 1863: Freeman to Newcastle
66NAI, CMS Y 2/2/2 Papers on Abeokuta District 1861-1910, Jan 1893: Letter from Oluminide (name not clearly
legible).
67In 1898, similarly, witnesses told the Commission on Trade that the Egba were returning to land vacated during
the wars – “from 5 miles below our crossing of the River Ogun, the whole valley, down to Abeokuta may be taken as
cultivated.” (CO 147/133, enc in 4 June 1898: Denton to Chamberlain, Thirteenth Day, extract from Mr. Berger’s
Report on the Abeokuta-Ibadan Reconnaissance Survey).
68NAUK, CO 147/162: 20 Oct, 1902: Acting Governor to Chamberlain.
69Fairhead and Leach (1996) demonstrate the problems of attributing deforestation to human causes. Still, the
pattern of forest clearing here is consistent with what is known about the Egba removal to Abeokuta and subsequent
re-expansion. The alternative narrative of forests created by recent human habitation is not plausible in the Egba
case.
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and this belt is gradually encroaching on the forest and is itself being encroached on by second rate
[fallow] land.”
It remains to explain land disputes. The period of land scarcity contributed to this by making
the conditions of grants more contentious. In a 1919 suit,70 the plaintiff Ajayi claimed that the
defendant Rolu had encroached on his land when Ajayi’s father Feyijimi died, extracting two acres
and claiming that he had lent the land to Feyijimi. The representative of the township chiefs told
the court that Rolu’s father had, in fact, granted the land to Feyijimi as forest, but that Feyijimi
had been the first to cultivate it. Rolu denied this, claiming that it had been given as already
cleared land during the Ikorodu War (c. 1865). His witness told the court that “there was no
forest remaining” at that time. What would have otherwise been a temporary grant with few
conditions attached, allowing Feyijimi to plant food crops while he cleared new land, was turned
by the scarcity of forest into a holding whose ownership was contested more than fifty years later.
Austin (2008a) notes that while land may be abundant in general, specific plots are valuable
for their particular characteristics. Bowen (1857, p. 282) noted that Egba farms were often ten to
twenty miles distant from the towns; many of the cases unsurprisingly involve encroachment into a
neighboring farm. This did not necessarily result from poorly-defined boundaries; in a 1915 case,
the defendant planted cocoa underneath that of the plaintiff while the latter’s niece, who had been
left in charge, was ill.71 Similarly, some sites were desirable for the protection that could be offered
by the olorogun (war chiefs). In a 1907 suit, the son of the late Balogun of Ijemo stated that during
a conflagration, the Igbein people had run to his father at Esi Elebo, who granted them land.72
The court cases can be used to show that some land was more valuable and worth defending. I
estimate regressions of the form:
(33) yi = β0 +
∑
c
βcCi +X
′
iγ + i
Here yi denotes an outcome of interest in case i. The Xi are other characteristics of the case;
dummies for whether it is a recovery case, whether it is a complete record, and the judgment book
from which the case is taken.73 The Ci are indicators for the crops affixed to the land. Results
are given in Table 7. The general pattern that emerges is that land that was more valuable due
to the crops on it was more vigilantly defended and more likely to be involved in a commercial
transaction. Plots endowed with palm trees were more likely to be pawned, and more likely to have
been defended through the use of a caretaker. Plots with either tree crop were more likely to have
been discussed before the township chiefs; either disputes were more common over these or parties
expended more effort in pursuing their claims over these.
Plots on which cocoa stood were, on average, more than £7 more valuable than other plots.
Cocoa was planted on what would otherwise have been the worst land, and so this is likely an
underestimate. Once marshy land acquired value, stale claims were reasserted. In a 1909 suit,
the plaintiff’s brother had planted kola on the defendant’s land in 1872 without dispute, but the
70Ake A Civil Suit 29/1919, re-hearing of Suit 1125 of 1917.
71Abeokuta Civil Suit 906/1915.
72Ake “A” Civil Suit 725/07.
73These are finer than year dummies.
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defendant attempted decades later to reclaim it.74 The inspector reported that “it is now that
people are using marshy soil for cocoa plantations that dfdt [defendant] came to claim.” Though
the plaintiff was evicted, the defendant was ordered to pay compensation for the kola.
5.4. Labor. Labor was scarce in Egba territory. The result was that it was uncommon for men to
exchange their labor for cash; for the freeborn, it was “opprobrious.”75 As land was virtually free,
individuals could earn more working for themselves than as hired laborers. Even during the slack
season, farmers could gather palm fruits or forest produce.76 Further, the considerable distances
between Egba farms raised the costs of supervision. Where wage-labor existed, it was provided
by foreign visitors with deep pockets and few dependents. The workers employed in printing the
missionary newsletter were paid four to five dollars per month.77 Even foreigners had trouble
acquiring labor. In 1854, the missionary Henry Townsend wrote that, “to keep down the salaries
of the native agents of the society is very difficult more especially so as some of them have had a
taste of European life in a style far above their means.”78 During their free days, slaves preferred to
cultivate for themselves rather than work for wage labor for the missionaries, and James Johnson
could not find anyone to tend a horse for 15s per month in 1877.79
This section deals in turn with three of the mechanisms used by the Egba to cope with labor
scarcity – slavery, cooperative work groups, and claims over the labor power of kin and dependents.
5.4.1. Slavery. The use of slaves was widespread. Christian converts who could be persuaded to
give up polygyny often would not abandon their slaves.80 Townsend wrote in 1846 that “the working
part of the population” consisted “chiefly” of slaves, while in the 1870s Johnson wrote that slaves
were a “very considerable” proportion of the population.81 Bowen (1857, p. 320) estimated in
mid-century that at least four fifths of the population were “free.”82 James Davies told the 1898
Commission on Trade that a third of the original inhabitants were slaves, and that women were
the most valuable of these.83
Slaves were generally strangers,84 and became slaves as a result of famine, capture, debt, or
as punishment for crime.85 Initially, the Egba raided their southern neighbors for slaves.86 The
increased prominence of the olorogun (war chiefs) gave them an advantage in slaveholding; in the
model this would be a fall in r. These chiefs were often able to evade the law prohibiting kidnapping
from friendly and subject towns.87 Both free and slave soldiers were required to turn over some
74Abeokuta Civil Suit 91/1909.
75Agiri (1974), p. 467.
76Clarke (1871), p. 262.
77Burton (1863), p. 76.
78CMS CA2/O85 #23: Aug 5, 1854: Townsend to Straith.
79Oroge (1971), p. 244-245.
80Oroge (1971), p. 222.
81Oroge (1971), p. 166.
82Burton (1863, p. 299) made the same estimate.
83NAUK, CO 147/133, enc in 4 June, 1898: Denton to Chamberlain. Evidence for 18th day.
84Interview: Chief F. Anidugbe, 27 July, 2007.
85Burton (1863), p. 301.
86Agiri (1981), p. 133.
87Oroge (1971), p. 127.
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or all of their captives to their commanders.88 James Davies stated that, during the early 1880s,
the most prominent men in Abeokuta had up to 400 slaves and treated them better than their
own children.89 The olorogun (war chiefs) also used their soldier-slaves to collect tolls, to provide
armed escorts for travelers, as blacksmiths, and as horse-minders.90 Some kept their slaves out of
the Ijaiye and Aibo wars in order to keep them on their farms, which Oroge (1971, p. 165-166) has
called “the economic nerve-centres of Yorubaland.”
Over time, slaves were increasingly purchased in markets to the North, in Rabba and Ilorin.
By 1870, James Johnson reported that “Hausa” slaves were predominant in Abeokuta.91 These
northerners were far from home and less likely to flee. Bowen (1857, p. 320) put the price of a slave
at thirty to sixty dollars, depending on age and quality.92 In an 1852 letter, Townsend described
the plight of a slave communicant, whose redemption price of sixty dollars was “very far beyond a
poor man’s means.”93
Slaves were used as soldiers, and even commanded armies.94 They were used for sacrifice.95 Most,
however, were employed in trade and agriculture. Male and female slaves were used as porters and
canoe pullers, and female slaves were used in palm oil production.96 In 1872, the Alake (the most
powerful of the four Egba kings) and other Egba officials wrote to the Governor of Lagos that slaves
were used “in the same way as children of our body begotten, they are to help us in working our
farms to obtain the produce needed in the European market, this is the only investment we have
here.”97 James Johnson in 1880 similarly noted that slaves were considered a better investment
than cloths and beads.98
In the model, increasing A makes slavery more attractive; the export market for palm produce
functioned in the same way. Burton (1863, p. 301) wrote that “the development of commerce
naturally increases the necessity for slave labour in a land where hired labour is expensive and
uncertain.” When James Johnson attempted in 1879 to enforce the CMS policy of forbidding its
members from holding slaves, he was confronted by a group of converts who were also prominent
88Agiri (1981), p. 133.
89NAUK, CO 147/133, enc in 4 June, 1898: Denton to Chamberlain. Evidence for 18th day. Agiri (1974, p. 468)
gives a similar estimate from 1880 that some chiefs had more than 100, and up to 400 slaves.
90Oroge (1971), p. 102-105, 130-131.
91Agiri (1981), p. 137.
92Other price estimates include: Barber (1857, p. 118), £6/10 or 30 heads of cowries for a woman in 1857; Burton
(1863, p. 323), 8 to 10 bags cowries in 1861, 12-16 for slaves preferred for export – at 18s per bag, this was equivalent to
£9 or 40 dollars, and; Alake and other officials 35-40 bags in 1872 (CO 147/23 enc in June 15, 1872: Pope Hennessey
to Kimberly, op. cit.), £16 for a runaway slave in 1862 (Oroge (1975, p. 69)).
93CMS CA2/O85 #13: July 29, 1852: Townsend to Venn.
94Losi (1924), p. 71.
95While Barber (1857, p. 129) describes the situation of a female convert whose Ijebu mistress wished to use her for
a sacrifice for reasons not given, Stone (1900, p. 245) was direct witness to the sacrifice by “the chiefs and Ogbonee
elders” of a slave purchased in the market. This was done in order to gain Ogun’s favor during the Ijaiye war. Oroge
(1971, p. 141), defending “domestic” slavery as opposed to the slave trade, argues that slaves used for sacrifice were
invariably purchased from markets, and that no master would sacrifice his own slave.
96McIntosh (2009), p. 130.
97NAUK, CO 147/23 enc in June 15, 1872: Pope Hennessey to Kimberly.
98Oroge (1971), p. 179.
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traders – Mary Coker, Lydia Yemowi, Susanah Lawolu, and Blesy Desola99 – and by “sword-
wielding agents of the Egba authorities.”100 These women demanded roughly £2/10 per year from
their trader-slaves, who could keep the surplus above this, while non-Christian owners were said to
have charged less.101
Europeans believed that, without the institution of slavery, there would be an acute shortage of
labor. A faction of missionaries led by Samuel Crowther argued for the continuation of domestic
slavery. While this was in part motivated by an “appreciation of the complex nature of the institu-
tion,” their self-interest in obtaining labor also played a role.102 As Townsend wrote in 1856, “we
are ourselves not in a position to refuse slave labor. A case in point, a servant hired by Mr Clegg
is a slave and a part of the hire goes to his master.”103 No pressure was brought on the Christian
converts to liberate their slaves after 1881, and in 1887 Reverend Wood cautioned against taking
actions to abolish slavery.104
When British intervention in the Yoruba interior became more direct after 1893, expatriate
merchants feared that widespread slave desertions had hurt trade. Rufus Alexander Wright told
the Commission on Trade that in Abeokuta and Ijebu “the slaves have felt safe in running away. I
don’t think there will ever be a return to the old system.”105 One observer wrote in 1893 that “the
money value of slaves [was] decreasing, and they [were] showing increased freedom in word and act”
because their chances of escaping to British territory had increased.106 The issue of labor scarcity
was not short-lived; in 1904 MacGregor reported the complaints of Aina, a “leading farmer,” who
argued that there was a “dearth of labor since the cessation of slavery, and [that] paid labour was
now both costly and difficult to obtain.”107
Because of these fears of labor scarcity, both the British and the EUG tacitly endorsed slavery.
Governor McCallum wrote in an 1897 dispatch that he was prepared to write to the ‘native states’
that “as regards domestic slaves the status quo must be maintained and runaways must in all
cases be given up by the governing powers unless funds are forthcoming to pay for the necessary
compensation.”108 The colonial office was sympathetic to his view that there should be no direct
interference with slavery, but forbade him to assist in recovery of fugitive slaves.109
In 1901, the EUG prohibited slave-dealing, though not slave-holding, providing that no person
should be “dealt or traded in, purchased, sold, bartered, transferred or become a slave.”110 At the
same time, the EUG declared that a slave could redeem himself for £5 and that an ill-treated slave
could claim freedom.111 The Railway Commissioner acted in concert with the Egba authorities
99Agiri (1981), p. 140.
100Oroge (1975), p. 79.
101Oroge (1971), p. 209.
102Agiri (1981), p. 139.
103CMS CA2/O85 #32: Dec 1, 1856: Townsend to Venn.
104Oroge (1971), p. 281.
105NAUK, CO 147/133, enc in 4 June, 1898: Denton to Chamberlain.
106NAI, CMS/Y/2/2/2, Papers on Abeokuta District, Jan 1893 letter from Oluminde.
107NAUK, CO 147/169 30 Jan, 1904: MacGregor to Lyttelton.
108NAUK, CO 147/121, 20 June, 1897: McCallum to Chamberlain.
109Oroge (1971), p. 387.
110NAI, Abe Prof 8/3, Report Book on Egba Affairs.
111Oroge (1971), p. 403.
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to help liberate slaves brought into Egba territory or whose masters were preparing to sell them,
but made no moves against slave-holding.112 Several examples of requests for manumission are in
evidence in the Mixed Court Civil Record Book (1907-09), in which payments of £5/10 or £10/10
are made. Certificates of freedom were issued by the court as late as 1922.113 Actively abolitionist
efforts, then, were limited to slave trading and exceptional cruelty.
5.4.2. Cooperative work groups. Austin (2008a, p. 597-598) argues that the scarcity of labor in
Africa is tempered by the seasonality of labor demand. Bowen (1857, p. 285) noted that during the
dry season, it was possible to “hire any number of people to labor for reduced wages.” A variety of
industries existed to raise the productivity of labor in the off-season, including what Burton (1863,
p. 160) called the “five great crafts” – blacksmith, carpenter, weaver, dyer and potter. For the
typical Egba farmer, however, peak labor demand occurred when manpower was least available.
While a client to could ask his chief to send men to help him clear his farm,114 two types of
cooperative work group – the owe and aro – were the most common solutions.
The owe was an informal arrangement, whereby a man’s sons-in-law, other relatives or neighbors
could be commissioned to aid in clearing a land or forest, or in building a house.115 The aro, by
contrast, was a contract between members of the same age-grade to take turns in assisting each other
in clearing, sowing, and harvesting.116 In both cases, the beneficiary “feasted his benefactors very
lavishly” and was obligated to offer his own labor in return.117 That these were sustained through
repeated interaction suggests that they were needed to overcome the moral hazard problems that
hindered the use of wage labor. This was strengthened in the case of the aro by its semi-religious
nature.118
5.4.3. Wives, kin, and dependents. Egba farmers coped with the shortage of labor by asserting
claims on the labor of other members of their households, by attracting dependants, and by taking
wives. Egba wives retained some economic independence, notably in trade and craft work; Stone
(1900, p. 23-24) wrote that:
women are even more industrious than the men. They have to support themselves
and their children and they most diligently follow the pursuits which custom has
allotted to them. They spin, weave, trade, cook, and dye cotton fabrics. They also
make soap, dyes, palm-oil, nut-oil, all the native earthenware and many other things
used in the country.
Despite this independence, marriage transferred current payments of cash and labor for future
claims on the productive and reproductive labor of the wife. Marriages were usually arranged.119
Families manipulated bridewealth to raise money for economic and social projects, and to pay
112Oroge (1971), p. 404.
113NAI, CSO 26 11799, Question of Slavery in British West Africa, 30 Sept 1924: District Officer, Egba to Resident,
Abeokuta. In this dispatch, the District Officer provides a list of fourteen cases from the years 1918-1922.
114Oroge (1971), p. 151.
115Fadipe (1970), p. 256.
116Agiri (1974), p. 467.
117Agiri (1974), p. 467.
118Oroge (1971), p. 154.
119McIntosh (2009), p. 84.
29
off debt.120 A woman’s relatives might use coercion and even violence to pressure her to become
married, and to stay married.121 The wife’s family was owed a variety of obligations including
work, regular contributions of harvest crops, and assistance with expenses such as funerals until
the girl reached puberty.122 A second cash payment, which Partridge (1911, p. 425) put between
£2/10 and £10 depending on the wealth of the bride’s parents, was then due.123
Payment of bride-price established claims on the children, and the repayment of bride-price due
on divorce lessened with the birth of children.124 Gollmer (1889, p. 119) described bride-price
(which he guessed at £2 to £5) as a sort of pledge used to chastise a wife – “have I not paid so
much on your head?” or “if you pay the forty or fifty heads of cowries I paid on your head, you can
go home again.” In divorce cases, it was common for men to receive custody of the children, under
the traditional belief that children “belonged” to their father.125 In a 1919 suit,126 the plaintiff sued
because his wife had been “seduced” by another man who had refunded the £5/10 bride-price, but
did not return his two children.
In a 1919 suit,127 the plaintiff Amodu sued the defendant Aridegbe for a £12/10 loan that had
been raised by Aridegbe’s husband Ewetade on which Aridegbe had been the pawn and Amodu
had been the surety. Ewetade had borrowed £10/10 to pay the bride-price owed to Aridegbe’s
previous husband. Amodu had taken Ewetade to his village, but Ewetade then fell ill. After “much
begging,” Aridegbe told the court that she had agreed to serve in his place for five months. After
a year, she “got tired of it and left to have another husband,” who had since returned the dowry
owed to Ewetade through the Itoko chiefs. She had a child for her previous husband, and had
left the child with Ewetade. Amodu and Ewetade together pawned the child, when her previous
husband intervened and sued successfully for custody. Despite the fact that Aridegbe was able to
leave her husband when a better opportunity arose, according to her own account her labor and
reproductive powers were manipulated by men.
Junior wives were expected to work for senior wives, and all wives were obligated to help their
husbands’ other male relatives.128 Women did the bulk of “domestic” labor – cooking, cleaning and
caring for younger children.129 Since a man’s obligations were to his parents and siblings, wives
were responsible for their children’s resources.130 Women did not traditionally take part in clearing,
120Byfield (1996), p. 34.
121Byfield (1996), p. 42-43.
122Hopkins (1969), p. 80.
123Folarin (1939, p. 18-20) divides the payments before marriage as follows: first, Baba gbo or Iya gbo, 22s and two
bottles gin; second, Ijohun, £3; third, Idana, £5/10 to £10/10, Ipalemo, £2/10 or more, and; fourth, Idamolidi Ifa,
£2 to £2/10. Together, these constituted Owo Ife, though in some cases a lump sum of “£10 to £15 or more” could
be paid.
124Lloyd (1968), p. 70.
125McIntosh (2009), p. 103.
126Header information is missing; plaintiff’s statement recorded on p. 436 of Ake “A” Civil Judgment Book Vol. 27,
1918-1919.
127Ake “A” Civil Suit 177/1919
128McIntosh (2009), p. 81, 88.
129McIntosh (2009), p. 111.
130McIntosh (2009), p. 112.
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planting,131 or sowing, but did prepare food on the farm for men and assisted in the harvest.132
Processing crops was women’s work. Campbell (1861, p. 51-52) described the arduous process of
turning palm fruits into oil and kernels. In return for their labor, women would retain the palm
kernels, while the revenue they earned selling oil was the property of their husbands.133
Marriage was polygynous. Stone (1900, p. 99-100) reported that a “man’s position and impor-
tance here are estimated by the number of his wives and the men seem willing to make almost any
sacrifice for a little fictitious notoriety.” Partridge (1911, p. 427) estimated that in the past a “man
in good position” would have as many as two hundred wives, though when he wrote thirty was
the most that a man might have. The important chiefs, impoverished by their loss of position and
“supply of free labor,” rarely had more than ten. Byfield (2002, p. 65) argues that the cocoa boom
at the turn of the century increased the demand for labor, creating a “rush to get wives.”
The marriages of slave wives, pawned girls, and kinless women were different.134 Folarin (1939,
p. 9) reported that if a pawnee wished to marry a female pawn, the “proper course” was to pay
bride-price to her family; if she were “defiled” by him, the pawn money would be forfeited. A 1910
report argued that it had been common to purchase slaves as wives during the Yoruba wars.135
While Folarin (1939, p. 13) suggests that a female slave who married her master thereby freed
herself and her children, McIntosh (2009, p. 85, 114-115) provides examples of Egba women who
did not become free or receive any better treatment. Two wives of the Jaguna Ogunbiyi fled to
Lagos in 1869, seeking asylum.136 In a 1918 case, the defendant claimed a piece of land through
his grandmother, a slave wife of the plaintiff’s patriarch Afonja.137 She had been redeemed by
her family while pregnant, demonstrating that her productive and reproductive capacities were
valuable to both her husband’s lineage and her own kin.
Dependants were desirable before 1893 for both their labor services and the security they pro-
vided. Fadipe (1970, p. 147) writes that each man “had the help of the dependent male members
of his family in tilling the field, planting crops, as well as reaping.” The EUG Secretary testified to
the WALC that “you would almost beg people to come live with you.”138 Immigrants, he argued,
were needed to protect settlements from outside raids, and so they could acquire land for a “return
payment, however small.”139 Accumulation of dependents did not end with the Yoruba wars. In
a 1915 suit, the defendant Abogurin had been brought to the plaintiff Akide around 1904 by a
mutual acquaintance, and asked for land.140 Akide told the court that “I agreed as I want good
people about me,” and made similar grants to nine other individuals. A “stranger” of this sort lived
under the protection of the family head; “it [was] his duty to rejoice with them in their happiness
131McIntosh (2009, p. 120) writes, conversely, that they did help with extra labor in planting.
132Hopkins (1969), p. 82.
133Fadipe (1970), p. 151.
134McIntosh (2009), p. 85.
135Hopkins (1969), p. 82.
136Oroge (1975), p. 78.
137Ake “A” Civil Suit 419/1918.
138WALC (1916b), p. 453.
139WALC (1916a), p. 187.
140Abeokuta Civil Suit 905/1915
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and sympathize with them in their sorrow.”141 He was expected to offer “voluntary” service in the
form of two or three days of labour annually.142 He was also to give presents at annual festivals
and make contributions towards family funeral expenses.143
Elders and the olorogun (war chiefs) had an advantage in attracting – or compelling – dependents,
which explains why Townsend noted that it was the chiefs who were “turning to agriculture” by
experimenting with crops such as cotton. One, he noted, “farms a large piece of ground and is
reputed to be sufficiently well off.”144 Ogundipe, the plaintiff’s witness in a 1919 suit,145 told the
court that their uncle Kute, “being older than us all he insisted that pltf [plaintiff] was to come
+ live in his village.” Burton (1863, p. 144) described Okukenu as “rich in land and slaves.” In a
1917 case, the defendant Alaji of Ikeredu claimed that his father was a slave who redeemed himself
but chose to remain with his master until his master attempted to sell him to pay off his debts; he
approached the Balogun of Ikereku, who gave him a site on which to build a house.146
A variety of institutions existed, then, enabling the Egba to cope with chronic labor scarcity,
and so the supply and demand for labor were resolved through competition for rights over per-
sons. While those with only their labor power to offer were compelled to rely on reciprocal work
arrangements, individuals with economic and social capital or means of coercion could access the
labor power of slaves, pawns, wives, sons, kin, and dependents.
5.5. Capital. The inability to use land as collateral made borrowing difficult, and this section
describes the credit institutions that did exist. Most important of these was the system of iwofa,
or human pawning. Next, this section discusses the difficulties Europeans faced advancing credit
to the Egba. Finally, it outlines impact of the introduction of kola and cocoa on the credit market.
5.5.1. Credit without collateral. A variety of institutions for borrowing existed other than human
pawning, though generally these were so unpleasant that the missionary Samuel Crowther in com-
parison called pawning “a custom of relief.”147 Barber (1857, p. 109) states that farmers’ rotating
credit societies prevented idleness, facilitated saving, and served as a form of insurance, but does
not suggest that they assisted the Egba to raise capital. Some 300 of these esusu clubs operated in
Abeokuta in 1861.148 Interest rates on cash loans were very high. Folarin (1939, p. 58) describes an
hypothetical loan of 20,000 cowries, on which 200 cowries would be charged as interest every market
day, totalling 40,000 over the course of a year.149 Barber (1857, p. 116) describes one communicant
who owed roughly 16s 8d to a creditor, onto which 5d interest was added every 9 days; this would
total 62% over the course of the year. A colonial official during the 1920s noted that the rich at
Owode had invested in receiving farms on pawn, and received 30-60% interest, with 100% paid in
141Folarin (1939), p. 69.
142Hopkins (1969), p. 85.
143WALC (1916a), p. 187.
144CMS, CA2/O85 #11.
145Ake “A” Civil Suit 119/1919.
146Ake “A” Civil Suit 163/1917.
147Oroge (2003), p. 337.
148McIntosh (2009), p. 133.
149He also gives the example of a loan of 12/6 with 5/6 interest charged after 7 months.
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the case of palms.150 In 1924, another official elsewhere in Yoruba territory cited interest rates of
30-60% as typical.151
The methods of collecting debt made these loans particularly unattractive. These were resorted
to because land had no value as collateral, and there were few substitutes available. Traders could
be seized for the debts of a countryman and sold into slavery.152 Folarin (1939, p. 60-61) lists
four methods of recovery – ogo, edan, emu, and sale into slavery.153 If ogo was used, a messenger,
possibly a leper, was sent to the debtor’s house. He could eat his food, wear his clothes, and “do
all in his power to worry or irritate him.” If the edan, a ceremonial staff was sent by the township
authorities to the house of the borrower and payment was not immediately forthcoming, the goods
or persons in the house could be sold. Emu enabled a creditor of long standing to recover his debts
by seizing persons or property of the debtor, who was fined for causing the authorities to become
involved. The debtor himself could be sold into slavery on application by to the ogboni (civil chiefs).
5.5.2. Human pawning. Iwofa (pawns) were those whose labor had been pledged for a debt. Labor
by the pawn was taken in lieu of interest until the principal was repaid. Pawnship first appears in
Egba oral histories in the settlement of Abeokuta, during which Egba pawned themselves to Itoko
and Ibara farmers to escape famine.154 In 1936, the Egba District Officer estimated that there
were five thousand iwofa in the division.155 Richer men could acquire more pawns; one informant
claimed that his father had 60 working in his farms.156
Describing iwofa amongst the Yoruba in general, the Senior Resident at Oyo wrote in 1924 that
the most common pawning contract was for a debt of £2/10 to £7/10. Critically, he noted that
“no one will lend money to a man under the above system unless the borrower is vouched for and
can find a surety who is responsible for the repayment of the loan.”157 The importance of the
guarantor, or onigbowo, is stressed by the proverb that “the iwofa suffers no inconvenience, it is the
guarantor who is inconvenienced.”158 The onigbowo was paid a fee of 6d, but became responsible
for repayment of the debt if the pawn died or absconded.159 The working of the iwofa system
depended, then, on a third party able to monitor and discipline the pawn.
Although colonial officials viewed iwofa as a voluntary act for adult men, with pawning of
children as an unacceptable form of disguised slavery,160 the Egba saw it primarily as one involving
children and dependents. The Alake volunteered the example of a son who pawned himself to save
the family head from the disgrace of being a debtor.161 Folarin (1939, p. 8-9) stressed that “[a]ny
150NAI, CSO 26 24873 Assessment Report Owode District
151NAI, CSO 26 06827 Vol II “Pawning of Children,” 17 Oct, 1924: Resident Oyo to Secretary, Southern Provinces.
152Townsend (1845), p. 3.
153These are also discussed in Hopkins (1969, p. 91-92)
154Ajisafe (1924), p. 64.
155NAI, Abe Prof 2 EDC 30 Iwofa: 12 Nov, 1936: District Officer Egba to Resident
156Interview: Chief J. Adeleye, 2 Sept, 2007.
157NAI, CSO 26 06827 Vol II ”Pawning of Children” 17 Oct, 1924: Resident Oyo to Secretary, Southern Provinces.
158Fadipe (1970), p. 191.
159Fadipe (1970), p. 191.
160Byfield (2003), p. 365.
161NAI, CSO 26/1 03063: Enactment of the Slavery Ordinance (1916); Nov 5, 1915: Secretary Egba Native Authority
to Commissioner.
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person male or female may be pawned, whatever his age, by his parents or relations.” One of my
informants suggested that:
since am polygamist I was then free to take two of my children one from each wives
and then go to the money lender that I needed money and so take these children of
mine let them be with you to assist you with your work while you borrow me money
I will come for them in two or three season time since I did not sell the children to
him and by the that time I will also bring the money.162
An iwofa would serve the creditor “in any capacity agreed upon.”163 A pawn’s family could
negotiate with the creditor about how their relative was treated.164 Pawns were given a daily
assignment to complete, while slaves were used “to any extent.”165 They could refuse transport
work.166 An iwofa might work half-days, from 6AM until noon for the olowo (creditor),167 two or
three days during the week,168 nine days out of every eighteen,169 one hundred heaps in a four day
week,170 or one week in three.171
The institution of iwofa, then, provided a resolution to both labor and capital scarcity where
alternative forms of collateral were unavailable. Oroge (2003) argues that the most common reasons
that individuals were pawned in Yoruba society were sieges during war, for the welfare of poor
children (as the olowo was obligated to care for a child pawn), and the heavy expenses incurred
in religious obligations, funerals, marriages and court fines – i.e., for consumption loans. Creditors
preferred to receive the labor services of pawns over holding other assets on pawn. There are a
handful of cases in the court records in which palms were made part of a debt contract only after an
iwofa arrangement had broken down.172 In a 1915 suit, the plaintiff’s brother had pawned himself
to the defendant for £5.173 The defendant claimed that, as no onigbowo could be found, he took
over the farm and palms as surety when the iwofa refused to serve him. Although he received
repayment of the principal, he told the court that “the nuts I reaped I took as my interest.”
5.5.3. European credit. Egba contact with European merchants did little to ameliorate these con-
ditions. Europeans were reticent to lend because of the risks involved. As early as 1863, Europeans
in Lagos complained that Africans could escape to Abeokuta, becoming “refugees for debt.”174 In
1912, John Deemin wrote to Ayles, another merchant, that he had advanced £3475 at Abeokuta,
162Interview: Chief T. Ojewumi.
163Folarin (1939), p. 8.
164Interview: R. A. Popoola, Sept 2, 2007
165Interview: I. A. Amosu, 27 July, 2007
166NAUK, CO 147/162: 20 Oct, 1902: Acting Governor to Chamberlain
167NAI, CSO 26/1 03063: Enactment of the Slavery Ordinance (1916): Short Memorandum on the Egba Native
Custom of Ofa (by A. Edun Oct 14, 1915).
168Barber (1857), p. xvii.
169Folarin (1939), p. 9.
170Byfield (2003), p. 361.
171Johnson (1921), p. 127.
172See Abeokuta Civil Suit 631/1915 and Abeokuta Civil Suit 854/1915, or Ake “A” Civil Suit 196/1919 for additional
examples.
173Abeokuta Civil Suit 538/1915.
174NAUK, CO 147/4, 6 Nov, 1863: Glover to Newcastle.
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and after accusing his correspondent of giving loans to risky borrowers, stated that it was “easy
enough to give out credit, but a very difficult matter to get it paid.”175
Together with Egba commercial interests, the European firms in Abeokuta and Lagos led an
unsuccessful campaign to make urban land attachable for trading debts. Here, the obstacle was
the combined policy of the colonial government and the EUG that foreigners were not to acquire
any permanent interests in land.176 A 1903 circular stipulated that lands and houses in Abeokuta
could not be sold or mortgaged to anyone not a native of Egbaland.177 This prohibition may have
been in force earlier; in a 1902 suit G.B. Ollivant & Co. attempted to attach Isaac Coker’s houses
and lands at Itesi for a debt; the court disallowed this, permitting them to send tappers to work
Coker’s rubber, but noting that “lands and houses are forbidden to be sold in all the Egba United
Government territories.”178
The outcome of this inability to provide collateral on loans was perverse; by the early 1920s,
demolition of houses for sale as scrap had become widespread. Folarin (1931, p. 81) wrote in 1930
that “several houses in the town have been demolished and the town bore every appearance of
warlike devastation and desolation.” In 1922, a petition signed by ogboni (civil chiefs), olorogun
(war chiefs), parakoyi (trade chiefs), Christians, and Muslims was sent to the Alake and Council
asking for the ability to attach land for debt.179 The document carried 800 signatures.180 The
council was aware that the destruction of houses was “not good” and that the restrictions raised
interest rates, but still chose to take no action.181
5.5.4. Tree crops. When palms, cocoa, or kola were pawned, no interest was charged and use of the
trees was turned over to the creditor until the loan was repaid. In the sample of court records it
is difficult to identify the specific terms on which palms were pawned. The number of trees given
over is only reported once – in a 1917 suit, the plaintiff claimed she had pawned twelve trees for
one shilling each.182 Still, seventeen clear examples of pawning of land with palm trees, without
any other tree crops mentioned, and in which the amount received is stated yield an average loan
of a little over £6/10.183
175RHL, Mss Afr s 1657 John Deemin Papers, Deemin to Ayles, 17 Jan 1908
176For an analysis of the reasons for this policy, which appeared in various forms throughout West Africa, see Phillips
(1989).
177NAUK, CO 147/166, enc in 9 June, 1903: MacGregor to Chamberlain.
178NAA, ECR 2/1/3 Civil and Criminal Record Book No. III 1902-03, Suit 337: G.B. Ollivant & Co. v. Isaac O.
Coker
179Folarin (1931), p. 115-118.
180NAA, ECR 1/1/19 Egba Council Records Vol 1.
181NAA, ECR 1/1/19 Egba Council Records Vol 1.
182Ake “A” Civil Suit 719/1917.
183Abeokuta Civil Suit 693/1908, pawned for 40 bags of cowries or £10 to pay medical expenses; Abeokuta Civil Suit
551/1915, pawned at Ilawo for £2/10 some time between 1875 and 1890 while the owner was away; Abeokuta Civil
Suit 556/1915 pawned more than seven years prior to the case for £2/10; Abeokuta Civil Suit 561/1915, pawned at
Igbo-Oya in 1897 for £10; Abeokuta Civil Suit 631/1915, pawned for £12/10 c. 1914 at Oluwo; Ake Central Suit
548/1905, pawned for £5, Abeokuta Civil Suit 70/1911, pawned less than ten years ago for £2/10 by a man with no
right to pawn it, Ake “A” Civil Suit 299/1917, pawned ten years prior for £5; Ake “A” Civil Suit 352/1917, pawned
six years earlier for £6 for after plaintiff’s mother died; Ake “A” Civil Suit 590/1917, pawned 12 years earlier for
£7/10; Ake “A” Civil Suit 124/1918, pawned for £3/10 a year before at Asaya; Ake “A” Civil Suit 792/1917, pawned
for £1/5 17 years and six months before at Olope; Ake “A” Civil Suit 225/1918, pawned at Awowo four years earlier
for £7/10; Ake “A” Civil Suit 31/1918, pawned at Agbadu in 1918 for £2/15 to pay damages in a trespass suit; Ake
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Pawning palms to raise capital was, however, problematic. The estimate cited above that the
interest on palm trees at Owode was much higher than that on other loans suggests a substantial
risk premium. Further, the estimated profit of 26s on 24 bearing trees was similar to the rate of
1s per tree in a pawning contract, which encouraged borrowers to redeem their loans as quickly as
possible.184 Early repayment created risk; in a 1905 suit, the defendant refused to accept sixteen
bags of cowries as redemption because he had not had time to do more than clear the land in the
two years it had been in his possession.185 The fundamental difficulty, however, was that palms
were not scarce.
Cocoa and kola presented fewer difficulties, though much of the evidence that they were used to
raise capital comes from the period after 1914. Ward-Price (1939, p. 92) argued that the pawning
of cocoa farms was common. In neighboring Ibadan, Captain Ross reported in 1926 that a loan of
£7 could be raised on 100 good cocoa trees – roughly 1/5 per tree.186 At Owode during the 1920s,
trees were typically pawned for 2/6 apiece.187 Seven cases in the records exist in which land with
cocoa and without palms being mentioned was pawned and the amount stated in court; the average
sum in these transactions is a little over £5/15.188 Each interviewee agreed that individuals could
use their cocoa farms as a source of credit. Investment of labor in the creation of a cocoa farm
established what Besley (1995) has called “Lockean” claims to ownership.189 This reduced some of
the uncertainties involved. Further, as a scarce asset with a higher annual yield, cocoa was simply
more valuable than palm trees. Finally, cocoa farms could also be sold.
6. Conclusion
Bad institutions are one of the fundamental causes of African poverty, and the institutions that
exist on the continent currently have been shaped by those that existed prior to colonial rule.
I have addressed a theme in the economics literature – how geography affects institutions – by
looking in depth at one hypothesis from the literature on African history. I find that African
land tenure, slavery, polygyny, credit markets, and states have all been decisively shaped by the
continent’s abundance of land and scarcity of labor. I find that this perspective explains much
about institutions in pre-colonial Africa, using both cross-sectional evidence on institutions and
detailed study of a single society. The use of a formal model and comparative data have made
several points that must be taken into account in understanding the impacts of under-population on
“A” Civil Suit 402/1918, pawned at Ibu four years previously for £3/15; Ake “A” Civil Suit 875/1918, the palm
trees alone pawned for £20 at Afojupa 10 years before; Ake “A” Civil Suit 583/1918, pawned for £5 at Igboro 18
years earlier; Ake “A” Civil Suit 143/1919, pawned for the deceased’s outstanding debts of £30/10 after his funeral
20 months earlier. In Ake “A” Civil Suit 130/1918, the defendant claimed the farm at Etepo had been pawned to
him for £22/10 a year before, but court was skeptical of the size of the loan and his failure to use the plot for over
seven months. This has not been included in the average.
184NAI, CSO 26 24873 Assessment Report Owode District.
185Ake Central Suit 174/1905.
186NAI, CSO 26 06827 Vol II “Pawning of Children” 30 Aug, 1926: Resident Oyo to Secretary, Southern Provinces.
187NAI, CSO 26 24873 Assessment Report Owode District.
188Abeokuta Civil Suit 740/1908, £2; Abeokuta Civil Suit 790/1908, two farms for £13/15 total (mean used in
calculation); Abeokuta Civil Suit 810/1915, £5; Abeokuta Civil Suit 942/1910, £3/15 for 400 trees; Ake “A” Civil
Suit 318/1917: disputed whether pawned for £10/15s or £5 (mean used in calculation); Ake “A” Civil Suit 593/1917,
£3/15; Ake “A” Civil Suit 1229/1917, pawned for £12/10, approximately ten years earlier.
189Locke believed that property was created by the application of labor.
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African institutions. First, when both productivity and population are low, the opportunity cost of
coercion is high, and the benefit to creating estates is low. This explains why slavery is less common
among the most sparsely populated African societies. Second, greater agricultural suitability (as
well as access to trade), will encourage increased reliance on slavery. This explains why some of
the most agriculturally prosperous though densely populated regions in Africa, such as Sokoto,
also used slaves most intensively (Hill, 1985; Lovejoy and Hogendorn, 1993). Third, where brides
were costly and polygyny existed in pre-colonial Africa, agricultural productivity (and hence the
marginal product of labor) was highest, but population density was also greater. Inequality, then,
is a prerequisite for unequal access to wives. Fourth, state strength in Africa has been associated
with population density, but is not systematically related to agricultural productivity. Finally,
there are substantial institutional spillovers across African societies relating to land, slavery, and
the power of states. These revisions to the current thinking allow the “land-abundance” perspective
to better explain institutions and institutional change in pre-colonial Egba society, and are borne
out in comparative data.
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Appendix A. Data Appendix
This appendix gives sources and definitions for the geographic variables used and lists the matches
used to connect the ethnic groups from Murdock (1967) to those in Murdock’s (1959) map. The
geographic raster data are joined to Murdock’s (1959) map by taking the average of the points
within an ethnic group’s territory.
A.1. GIS Data. Sources of GIS data and variable descriptions are given in Table 1.
Table 1: Data Sources
Variable Description Citation Link
Agric. Suit. The GAEZ reports an index be-
tween 0 and 10 combining climate,
soil and terrain slope constraints.
The “Agric. Suit.” Measure is this
the maximum of the observed val-
ues, minus this index, divided by the
observed range.
Fischer et al.
(2002)
http://www.iiasa.
ac.at/Research/LUC/
SAEZ/index.html
Pop. Dens. 1960 Population density in 1960 per Sq.
Km.
UNESCO
(1987) through
UNEP/GRID-
Sioux Falls
http://na.unep.net/
datasets/datalist.
php
Elevation Elevation in Km. N/A http://epp.
eurostat.ec.europa.
eu/
Precipitation Average annual precipitation (m).
Missing values (due to differences
in resolution between the data and
map) are imputed using the nearest
raster point.
Fischer et al.
(2002)
http://www.iiasa.
ac.at/Research/LUC/
SAEZ/index.html
Temperature The accumulated temperature on
days with mean daily temperature
above 0 ◦C. 55537 is treated as miss-
ing and these points are dropped be-
fore the join. Missing values im-
puted using the nearest raster point.
Fischer et al.
(2002)
http://www.iiasa.
ac.at/Research/LUC/
SAEZ/index.html
Continued on next page
45
Variable Description Citation Link
Abs. Latitude Absolute value of the latitude of the
ethnic group’s centroid, reported by
ArcMap.
N/A N/A
Dist. to Lake Vic-
toria
Distance, in 1000 Km, from the eth-
nic group’s centroid to the center of
Lake Victoria, calculated using the
globdist function for Stata written
by Kenneth Simons.
N/A N/A
Dist. to Coast Average distance from all points in
the ethnic group territory to the
nearest point on the coast, in dec-
imal degrees, calculated in ArcMap.
N/A N/A
Malaria Suit. Climatic suitability for malaria
transmission.
Adjuik et al.
(1998)
http://www.mara.
org.za/lite/
download.htm
Tsetse Suit. The raw data is the predicted pres-
ence of tsetse using satellite imagery
on eco-climatic data, human popu-
lation, and predicted cattle and cul-
tivation levels. Because human pop-
ulation may be endogenous, this is
converted into a binary variable (1 if
it is greater than 0.5) and regressed
as a probit on quadratics in precip-
itation, elevation, temperature, lat-
itude and longitude. The predicted
probability from this probit is used
as the measure of tsetse suitability.
Wint and Rogers
(2000)
http://ergodd.zoo.
ox.ac.uk/paatdown/
index.htm
Ruggedness This is calculated using the user-
written Vector Ruggedness Measure
script for ArcMap. It “measures
terrain ruggedness as the variation
in three-dimensional orientation of
grid cells within a neighborhood.”
The input data is the elevation data
listed above, and the neighborhood
size selected is 3, the smallest pos-
sible. Missing values imputed using
the nearest raster point.
Sappington et al.
(2007)
http://arcscripts.
esri.com/details.
asp?dbid=15423
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Variable Description Citation Link
Population
Weight
This is an estimate of the popu-
lation of the ethnic group, calcu-
lated by summing over the popula-
tions of cells contained in the pop-
ulation density data. If more than
one group is assigned to a single ter-
ritory, the population of each group
is taken as the sum of the population
within that territory divided by the
number of groups.
N/A N/A
A.2. Matches. Ethnic groups were matched from the Ethnographic Atlas to Murdock’s (1959)
map first by name, then by location. The majority (426) were matched exactly by name, and
most of the rest were matched by using an alternative spelling (40) or alternative name (15). For
some, the division of ethnic groups in the atlas did not match that in the map, and so these were
matched either to a larger group of which they are are a part (a “supergroup” – 20), a smaller
group (a “subgroup” – 4), or another group that is part of the same “supergroup” (an “alternative
supergroup” – 5). Finally, 21 groups could not be identified with those in the map, and so were
matched to whatever group is at the latitude and longitude co-ordinates specified in the Atlas.
Groups that matched exactly are not listed. Groups that had to be otherwise identified are given,
along with the group to which they are matched and type of match in Table 2. This table also
includes an ISO 693-3 code that indicates a corresponding entry in Gordon and Grimes (2005).
Where this entry does not contain enough information on its own to justify the match, additional
notes have been added to Table 2.
Table 2: Matches
Name in Atlas Name in Map ISO 639-3 Name in Atlas Name in Map ISO 639-3
Alternative Spelling
AULLIMIND AULLIMINDEN ttq KARAMOJON KARAMOJONG kdj
BAFIA FIA ksf KIPSIGIS KIPSIGI kln
BALI LI mhk KURAMA KURAMA, GURE (SE) krh
BAMUM MUM bax LAKA LAKA(ADAMAWA) lak
BANEN NEN baz LENGE HLENGWE cce
BANYANG ANYANG ken MBANDJA BANZA mmz
BASAKOMO BASA bzw NGULU NGURU ngp
BENIAMER AMER amf NGUMBI NGUMBE khu
BIRIFOR BIRIFON bfo NYANKOLE NKOLE nyn
BISA BUSANSI bib PLTONGA TONGA toi
BOMBESA MBESA zms PLAINSBIR BIRA brf
CHAGGA CHAGA jmc/old PLAINSSUK SUK pko
Continued on next page
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Name in Atlas Name in Map ISO 639-3 Name in Atlas Name in Map ISO 639-3
CHAWAI JERAWA, CHAWAI(SW) cch SAPEI SABEI kpz
DAKAKARI BAKAKARI dri SARA SALA sba
FUNGOM FUNGON bfm SHAWIYA SHAWIA shy
FUTAJALON FOUTADJALON fuf SIWANS SIWA siz
GIRIAMA GYRIAMA nyf XHOSA XOSA xho
GURE KURAMA, GURE (SE) krh ZENAGA ZENEGA zen
HILLSUK SUK pko ZINZA SINZA zin
HONA KONA hwo ZUANDE ZUANDE, BATU(E) N/A
Alternative Name
ABRON BRONG abr KAKWA BARI keo
AWUNA GRUNSHI ewe LAKETONGA NYASA tog
BOROROFUL SOKOTO fuv MAMBWE LUNGU mgr
FALASHA KEMANT ahg MBUTI LESE les
GALAB RESHIAT dsh NGONDE NYAKYUSA nyy
HATSA KINDIGA hts RIFFIANS RIF rif
JIMMA JANJERO jnj TURA GURO goa/neb
KAGURU SAGARA kki
Subgroup
SHONA KARANGA sna SOMALI MIJERTEIN som
SIDAMO KAMBATA sid TSWANA NGWATO tsn
Alternate Subgroup
ALAGYA AVIKAM ald SHANGAMA BAKO aiz
KAGORO KATAB kcg UBAMER BAKO aiz
NANKANSE GURENSI gur
Supergroup
AFIKPO IBO ibo HAMMAR OMETO amf
ANFILLO MAO myo KANAWA HAUSA hau
ARBORE KONSO arv KASENA GRUNSHI xsm
BANNA OMETO amf MALE OMETO mdy
BASKETO OMETO bst NGONI SENGA ngo
BASSARI TENDA bsc TALLENSI GURENSI gur
BOMVANA XOSA xho TSAMAI KONSO tsb
CONIAGUI TENDA cou VUGUSU LUO luo
DIME OMETO dim YATENGA MOSSI mos
DORSE OMETO doz ZAZZAGAWA HAUSA hau
EFIK IBIBIO efi
Location
ANAGUTA AFUSARE nar LOWIILI BIRIFON N/A
BADITU OMETO N/A MESAKIN KOALIB jle
BODI TOPOTHA mym MORO TALODI mor
BURJI BORAN bji NYARO KOALIB fuj
Continued on next page
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DJAFUN NAMSHI fub OTORO TAGALI otr
ISALA WABA sil SHAKO KAFA she
KARA KEREWE reg TIRA TALODI tic
KORONGO TUMTUM kgo TIRIKI NANDI ida
KUSASI GURENSI kus TULLISHI NYIMA tey
LALIA KELA lal WODAABE KANURI fuq
For AWUNA, see Grindal (1972).
KANAWA refers to the city of Kano.
For VUGUSU, see Wagner (1949).
YATENGA refers to the Mossi capital.
ZAZZAGAWA refers to the city of Zaria.
Djafun-Bororo is a Fulbe group.
Appendix B. Sample Case: Abeokuta Civil Suit 137/1909
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In the Native Court of Abeokuta Thursday the 4th day of March 1909 Before A.B. Green and
S.J. Peters, Judges.
137/09 Odunusi of Ake vs. Taiwo of Kemta
Recovery of farm land at Olugbo property of the pltff
Odunusi sworn on Bible states: I am of Ake am a Farmer - my father Durojaiye of Ake took
this farm at Olugbo in dispute as farm forest – after the Abo war – I accompanied my late father
there together, with my brother Fatoki and two pawn men of my father. Lukosi of Kemta father of
Deft Taiwo came to this farm 3 years after us, my late father Durojaiye gave portion him Lukosi
some portion of his own forest farm to work upon – One Daresu an elder brother of my father
Durojaiye had some forest farm Darun in his life time worked some portion of this and died, this
Darun’s portion both Irapa + forest was taken now by Deft Taiwo as farm belonging to his late
father Lukosi – Durojaiye and Darun were brothers of the same parents. Darun had children as
my self + Fatoki are sons of Durojaiye. The farms of Durojaiye and Darun are now being claimed
by Deft – which has no right to do.
Deft – Taiwo sworn on the Bible States: - I am of Kemta, am a farmer. One Ande of Kemta took
my father Lukosi of Kemta to this farm at Olugbo about the Abo war. Durojaiye father of pltff
first got to this farm, and first took his portion of forest, then my father took next then Lukosi’s
boys, about 13 boys then serving my late father in this farm. I never heard of the name of Darun in
this farm during the Ibadan warfare against the Egbas bother my father + Durojaiye pltff’s father
left this farm and never returned to the place till about 12 years ago when my father’s people and
pltff returned to the farm – but I did not for pltff laid hold of his father’s farm and my father’s
boys laid hold of my father’s. There is the Porogun trees planted on the boundary of the farms of
Durojaiye and Lukosi till today. It was the plaintiff who trespassed on my father’s land. I never
knew any farm belonging to Darun in this part.
For pltff Fatoki sworn on cutlass states: - I am of Ake, am an Ifa priest and son of Durojaiye.
Ande of Kemta and my father Durojaiye started at the same time for this farm region the same
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day Ande took his portion and Durojaiye this portion side by side. My father Durojaiye first got to
this farm, three years after Lukosi father of Deft came, my father there gave him the forest farm of
one Sholoye which my father had taken for him and he never turned up. After the warfare Lukosi
people and my father’s people had to leave this farm. At the return Lukosi people laid claim on
our father’s farm . by trespassing over the boundary. I heard at a time the Kemta planted Porogun
trees on the boundary. Darun an elder brother of Durojaiye my father had a farm, which is now
being claimed by Deft in conjunction with Durojaiye’s.
Aboni sworn on Cutlass States: I am of Kemta. One Faroubi of Kemta took us to this farm. We
were there for good length of time before Durojaiye Father of pltff came. Durojaiye came of himself
but Ande of Kemta gave him forest. Lukosi father of Deft came two years after Durojaiye, Lukosi
took portion of farm Durojaiye had reserved for one of his people but it was forest. The farm in
dispute is part of Lukosi’s farm. Lukosi’s farm is in the middle of Durojaiye’s farm and Igbonla –
on the other side of Durojaiye is Ogunbiyi’s farm. At a time when there was a dispute of boundary
between Lukosi and Durojaiye’s farm, the Kemta chiefs settled it then by planting porogun trees.
These trees are there till today.
For Deft Sanyaolu sworn on cutlass states: I am Kemta am a carver and a hunter. Ande of
Kemta was my grandfather who took Durojaiye father of pltff to this farm and allotted to him
portion of forest farm land. This Ande took Lukosi father of Deft to this farm Olugbo and gave
him forest farm. This was at the Ijaiye war. I was then present. I was as old as I am during the
Abo war of 1857.
I say the court after cross examination that I am telling a lie.
Case adjourned till Monday Mar-8-09
A.B. Green Pres.
Saml J. Peters
[Page 515]
In the Native Court of Abeokuta Monday the 8th day of March 1909 Before A.B. Green and S.J.
Peters Judges.
137/09 Oduwusi of Ake vs. Taiwo of Kemta
Recovery of farm land at Olugbo property of the pltff
Dagin sworn on cutlass states: I am of Kemta. I know the farm in dispute at Olugbo. The farm
was originally taken Lukosi of Kemta during the Abo war. I know that the farm was originally taken
by Lukosi because I accompanied them there 17 days after – Ande, Ogunbiyi and Durojaiye father
of pltff each took portion of this farm alongside one another. Ogunbiyi was in the middle of these
people. Durojaiye being on one side Likosi father of Deft is on the right hand of Durojaiye, Lukosi
gave his left to Igbo Inta. The land mark between Durojaiye and Lukosi was made by planting
Porogun trees by the Kemta people when there was difference on this land at a time Durojaiye
father of pltff had a farm there and Lukosi father of Deft also had a farm.
Aruno sworn on cutlass states: I am of Kemta. I was slave of Lukosi father of Deft. This farm
was taken during the Abo war. I did not go with them but afterwards I went there after two years
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Lukosi got there. Durojaiye was the first to get to this farm then Lukosi my master. When Lukosi
came he took the forest next to Durojaiye. Durojaiye never ran away from this farm, but died.
Case adjourned till Wednesday when escort will be sent to this farm to see the porogun trees
planted by the Kemta people.
A.B. Green Pres.
Saml J. Peters
[Page 536]
Oseni sworn on the Koran states: I am police no. 29 EUG. I was sent by the court to the farm
in question at Olugbo. I summonsed the villagers. I found the two farms of pltff and deft side by
side. The boundary was marked by Porogun trees from one end to another, these porogun trees
were planted by Chiefs of Kemta, when there was a fight on this subject once. Pltff showed me two
porogun trees which one was in the middle of Defts farm, and one in some part of a road which he
said was boundary. I found it was no boundary and the villagers said the same that boundary is
the straight demarcation in which porogun trees were planted straight from one end to another. It
was pltff who trespassed into Defts farm. The porogun trees in the boundary are about 24. The
poroguns are about 5 years old. The two poroguns pltf showed me were trees of themselves of no
object.
Judgment – Court decides that the boundary as marked by the 24 porogun trees planted by
the authorities of Kemta should from now be taken as boundary between the land farms of late
Durojaiye of Ake and Lukosi of Kemta. No notice should ever be taken of the two accidental
porogun trees pointed out by pltff. Judgment for Deft.
A.B. Green Pres.
Saml J. Peters.
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Appendix C. Tables and figures
Figure 1. Institutional regions and dynamics
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Figure 2. Agricultural Suitability and Population Density, 1960
Agricultural suitability is on the left, population density on the right. Darker colors indicate higher values; the range
of agricultural suitability is from 0 to 1, while the range for population density is from 0 to 315.25.
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Figure 3. Egba Local Government Areas in Ogun State
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Figure 4. Punch‘s Tour of Egba Country, 1902
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Table 3. Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Institutional Outcomes
Any Indiv. Land Rights 0.93 0.25 0 1 404
Any Slavery 0.85 0.36 0 1 454
Consideration for Bride 0.93 0.26 0 1 529
Polygyny 0.95 0.21 0 1 517
State Stratification 0.34 0.47 0 1 475
Class Stratification 0.53 0.5 0 1 426
Geographic Controls
Agricultural Suitability 0.53 0.18 0 1 531
Population Density (1960) 21.8 29.3 0 315 531
Elevation 703 506 -14.9 2306 531
Precipitation 1.12 0.57 0.013 2.98 531
Temperature 8.82 1.19 5.31 10.8 531
Malaria Suit. 0.77 0.33 0 1 531
Tsetse Suit. 0.54 0.42 0 1 531
Dist. to Coast. 5.5 3.84 0.023 14.9 531
Dist. to Lake Victoria 2.37 1.51 0.13 5.8 531
Ruggedness 0.22 0.076 0.031 0.77 531
Abs. Latitude 9.89 7.58 0.017 36.6 531
Population Weight 410 1267 0.34 25611 531
Controls from Ethnographic Atlas
Major Crop: Missing 0.072 0.26 0 1 531
Major Crop: None 0.024 0.15 0 1 531
Major Crop: Tree Fruits 0.089 0.28 0 1 531
Major Crop: Roots and Tubers 0.16 0.37 0 1 531
Date Observed 1919 21.7 1830 1960 531
Notes: The omitted crop type is cereal grains, the mode.
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Table 4: Tests 1 and 2
Any Indiv. Land Rights
Agricultural Suitability 2.12*** 3.06** 3.23*** 2.94*** 2.50**
(0.740) (1.539) (0.936) (1.019) (0.976)
Ln(Pop. Density) 0.55***
(0.143)
Pop. Density (1960) -2.56
(4.322)
Pop. Density Sqd. 12.92
(8.531)
Observations 404 368 321 321 321
Other Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region F.E. North/Sahara No Yes Yes Yes
Any Slavery
Agricultural Suitability 0.03 1.93*** 1.63* 1.66* 1.74**
(0.600) (0.715) (0.888) (0.877) (0.815)
Ln(Pop. Density) 0.47**
(0.187)
Pop. Density (1960) 1.98
(1.295)
Pop. Density Sqd. -0.63
(0.456)
Observations 454 454 366 365 366
Other Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region F.E. North/Sahara No Yes Yes Yes
Continued on next page
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Consideration for Bride
Agricultural Suitability -1.10 1.19 3.44* 3.43* 3.43*
(1.028) (1.368) (2.039) (1.988) (1.991)
Ln(Pop. Density) 0.13
(0.226)
Pop. Density (1960) 0.28
(1.331)
Pop. Density Sqd. -0.12
(0.400)
Observations 491 529 413 412 413
Other Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region F.E. North/Sahara No Yes Yes Yes
Polygyny
Agricultural Suitability -0.68 4.69*** 6.06*** 6.06** 5.26*
(0.447) (1.672) (2.286) (2.605) (2.858)
Ln(Pop. Density) 0.38
(0.413)
Pop. Density (1960) 2.38
(3.151)
Pop. Density Sqd. -0.80
(2.234)
Observations 517 434 205 203 205
Other Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region F.E. North/Sahara No Yes Yes Yes
Continued on next page
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State Stratification
Agricultural Suitability 0.93* 1.32** 0.53 0.59 0.08
(0.536) (0.665) (0.715) (0.737) (0.746)
Ln(Pop. Density) 0.32**
(0.141)
Pop. Density (1960) 2.67*
(1.373)
Pop. Density Sqd. -1.43
(0.950)
Observations 475 475 475 472 475
Other Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region F.E. North/Sahara No Yes Yes Yes
Class Stratification
Agricultural Suitability -0.15 -0.08 -0.33 -0.37 -0.64
(0.587) (0.994) (1.020) (1.009) (0.847)
Ln(Pop. Density) 0.21
(0.164)
Pop. Density (1960) 2.70*
(1.505)
Pop. Density Sqd. -1.34
(0.985)
Observations 426 426 401 400 401
Other Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region F.E. North/Sahara No Yes Yes Yes
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are probit, with coefficients reported. Observations
are weighted by estimated population in 1960 and standard errors are clustered by region.
Region FE: African Hunters, South African Bantu, Central Bantu, Northeast Bantu, Equatorial Bantu, Guinea
Coast, Western Sudan, Nigerian Plateau, Eastern Sudan, Upper Nile, Ethiopia/Horn, Moslem Sudan, Sahara, North
Africa, and Indian Ocean.
Other Controls: Malaria suitability, tsetse suitability, ruggedness, dummies for major crop types (missing, none,
tree fruits, roots/tubers included, cereal grains excluded), date of observation, absolute latitude, absolute latitude X
latitude > 0, and quadratics in elevation, annual precipitation, accumulated temperature, distance to lake Victoria,
and distance to the nearest coast.
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Table 5. Neighbor effects
Any Indiv. Land Rights Any Slavery
Agricultural Suitability 2.16 2.09
90% CI [0.48,3.91] [0.37,4.19]
ρ -0.22 0.70
90% CI [-0.36,-0.06] [0.31,0.96]
Region FE North/Sahara North/Sahara
Other Controls Yes Yes
obs 368 454
Consideration for Bride Polygyny
Agricultural Suitability 0.76 -2.01
90% CI [-0.59,2.11] [-4.48,0.26]
ρ 0.10 0.23
90% CI [-0.09,0.33] [-0.05,0.63]
Region FE North/Sahara North/Sahara
Other Controls Yes Yes
obs 491 434
State Stratification Class Stratification
Agricultural Suitability 0.59 0.33
90% CI [-0.23,1.46] [-0.45,1.11]
ρ 0.31 0.32
90% CI [0.16,0.44] [0.18,0.46]
Region FE North/Sahara North/Sahara
Other Controls Yes Yes
obs 475 426
Notes: 90% confidence intervals in brackets. All regressions are spatial probit, with coefficients reported (see LeSage
and Pace (2009)).
Other Controls: Malaria suitability, tsetse suitability, ruggedness, dummies for major crop types (missing, none,
tree fruits, roots/tubers included, cereal grains excluded), date of observation, absolute latitude, absolute latitude X
latitude > 0, and quadratics in elevation, annual precipitation, accumulated temperature, distance to lake Victoria,
and distance to the nearest coast.
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Table 6. Summary statistics: Court cases
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Case is Complete 0.66 0.47 0 1 541
Recovery 0.64 0.48 0 1 541
Trespassing 0.23 0.42 0 1 541
Year 1914 5.15 1902 1919 541
Cocoa 0.27 0.44 0 1 541
Palm Trees 0.38 0.48 0 1 541
Water 0.072 0.26 0 1 541
Damages or Value Claimed 14.9 29.9 0.50 300 366
Land Pawned 0.25 0.43 0 1 541
Land Sold 0.12 0.33 0 1 541
Boundary Made 0.15 0.36 0 1 541
Destruction of Crops or Boundaries 0.094 0.29 0 1 541
Taken to Chiefs 0.26 0.44 0 1 541
Caretaker 0.11 0.32 0 1 541
Juju 0.059 0.24 0 1 541
Participant Driven Out 0.089 0.28 0 1 541
Notes: ”Water” indicates a stream, river, marsh or swamp. ”Cocoa,” ”Kola” and ”Palm Trees” indicate that these
are stated to exist on the land in dispute. ”Previously Taken to Chiefs” indicates the dispute was previously taken
to the township chiefs. Events such as ”Land Pawned” or ”Juju Placed” indicate that these occurred at any point in
the land’s history.
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Table 7. Land characteristics, transactions and strategies
Value and Transactions
Damages/Value Pawned Sold
Cocoa 7.40** 0.13 0.32**
(3.172) (0.115) (0.156)
Palm Trees -6.26** 0.35*** 0.05
(2.441) (0.085) (0.078)
Water -7.89*** -0.52 0.15
(1.446) (0.348) (0.263)
Observations 366 541 541
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
Judgment Book F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Strategies
Destruction Taken to Chiefs Caretaker Driven Out
Cocoa 0.57** 0.30** -0.07 0.40*
(0.246) (0.128) (0.132) (0.209)
Palm Trees 0.04 0.45*** 0.51*** 0.11
(0.196) (0.098) (0.145) (0.175)
Water 0.18 -0.18 0.13 -0.04
(0.477) (0.174) (0.304) (0.215)
Observations 541 541 541 541
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Judgment Book F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions except with “Damages/Value” are probit, with
coefficients reported. “Damages/Value” is OLS. Other controls are a dummy if the claim is for recovery and a
dummy if the case is complete. Standard errors are clustered by judgment book.
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